FILOSOFISK SUPPLEMENT

14. ÅRGANG | #2/2018

PLURALISME

Verdenen vi lever i er kompleks, mange av problemene vi møter hver dag er svært mangefasetterte, både i samfunn, politikk, vitenskap, estetikk, matematikken og selv innen logikken. Pluralismen er et faktum. Hvordan skal vi finne fornuftige svar på vanskelige spørsmål, når selv våre mest grunnleggende intellektuelle prosedyrer gir tvetydige svar?

Filosofisk supplements femtiende (!) nummer har temaet pluralisme. I dette nummeret møter du en bred familie teorier, som på sine respektive områder mener at løsningene på sentrale problemer ikke kan være monistiske, altså enestående i ordets grunnleggende betydning, men må være pluralistiske.

Bladets første artikkel undersøker Patrick J. Winther-Larsen tre teoriers svar på "the boundary problem", et problem innen politisk filosofi. Problemet: Hvordan berettiger teoriene, om berettiget territorialmakt, det at stater utøver makt over territorier (innenfor statenes grenser), som ikke møter kravene som teoriene stiller til hvordan stater med rette kan kreve land? Winther-Larsen argumenterer for at de tre ledene teoriene om berettiget territorialmakt, møter problemer som hindrer dem fra å løse dette problemet.

Spalten I praksis, i dette nummeret skrevet av Eviane Leidig, handler om multikulturalisme, og diskuterer to debatter i faglitteraturen vedrørende multikulturalisme, overgangen fra en tidligere biologisk rasisme til en nyere kulturell rasisme og fremveksten av post-rase-diskurs.

I spalten Fra forskningsfronten kaster Helgardt Mahrdt lys over historien til, og betydningen av, begrepet "pluralitet". Hun hevder at pluralitet ikke bare er et faktum i verden og i samfunnet, men også at tenkning i seg selv er en pluralitetsøvelse. Faktisk, sier hun med Arendt, vil ethvert forsøk på å fjerne pluralitet fra tenkning ikke bare gjøre den fremmed for sin egen natur – den ensidige tenkningen er også i sin monistisk destruktive følgeriktighet sentral for det totalitære sinn.

Hans Robin Solberg diskuterer Nelson Goodmans teori om symptomene ved det estetiske, forstått som egenskaper ved symboler. Istedenfor å karakterisere det estetiske vagt med henvisninger til 'det vakre', eller å redusere det estetiske til en sosial illusjon blant en klasse esteter, utvikler Goodman en teori som beskriver det særegne ved estetiske symboler. Denne forklaringen leder ikke til et entydig svar på spørsmålet 'Hva er det estetiske?'. Svaret er heller at en pluralisme av symbolske symptomer utgjør det estetiske. Videre argumenterer Solberg for at Goodmans teori kan forklare viktigheten av det estetiske sin institusjonelle kontekst – som museer, kunstsalg og kunstutdannelse – uten å redusere det estetiske til dette institusjonelle, ved å forklare hvordan det estetiske og dets institusjonelle kontekst er essensielt forbundet.

I anmeldelsen diskuteres Ingen mennesker er født frie, en antologi om liberalisme. Boka tar for seg hvordan liberalismen har tatt monopol på politikken, og samfunnet. Boka er en kritikk av dette, og forsøker å vise hvordan en annen politisk tenkning er mulig. Over ti artikler tas liberalismens omfattende innflytelse på samfunn og tenkning opp, og kritiseres. Anmeldelsen er skrevet av Håkon Blystad

Sverre Hertzberg og Vera Gjermundsen oversetter et utdrag fra den italienske filosofen og marxisten Antonio Gramscis dagbøker fra fengselet, hvor han ble satt, på tross av sin parlamentariske immunitet, da Mussolini i et anfall av paranoia satte i kraft de italienske beredskapslovene, og fengslet det han fant av meningsmotstandere, i 1926. Gramsci satt innesperret til han døde, 46 år gammel, i 1937. I fengselet skrev Gramsci dagbøkene som utgjør mesteparten av hans forfatterskap. I det her oversatte utdraget, skrevet da Gramsci lå på dødsleiet, argumenterer Gramsci mot Benedetto Croces idealistiske syn på historien, og spesifikt mot Croces syn på lidenskapene.

Utdragene fra Leksikryptisk Encyclopedi handler om sannhet, sannhetspluralisme og Jean Paul Sartre. I hovedutdraget presenteres sannhetspluralisme, en familie posisjoner som hevder at sannhet er flere egenskaper, og noen varianter av sannhetspluralisme presenteres. Som alltid har vi to mesterbrev, et reisebrev, denne gangen fra Cambrigde, og en quiz.

Som dere kanskje ser, dekker vi temaet pluralisme på mange måter, estetisk pluralisme, politisk pluralisme, logisk pluralisme, sannhetspluralisme, og kanskje noen til, litt avhengig av hvordan man deler dem opp. Dette viser at pluralisme er et uunngåelig tema på nesten alle filosofiske fagområder. Her har vi prøvd å vise pluralismens pluralisme, så å si. Vi håper dere vil like det!

God lesning!   Håkon Blystad & Joachim Kvamme
redaktører

THE PUZZLE OF SURPLUS TERRITORY:
THEORIES OF TERRITORIAL RIGHTS AND THE BOUNDARY PROBLEM

Different theories of territorial rights provide different reasons for what legitimizes territorial claims. This essay examines the three main families of such theories currently on offer in the literature—the voluntarist, statist, and nationalist—in connection with what has been labelled *the* (geographical) *boundary problem*. The problem, in brief, is that none of these theories seem to justify states claiming territory that is enclosed by their boundaries but that do not satisfy their respective criteria for valid territorial claims. It is argued that the concern raised is valid, and that statist theories face the additional problem of justifying what attaches particular states to particular territory.

By Patrick J. Winther-Larsen

In this essay I will discuss the boundary problem faced by theories of territorial rights in contemporary political philosophy. The problem is that of justifying the totality of territory over which states claim jurisdiction, over and above what they meaningfully require to perform their legitimating functions and/or what their population is in fact attached to. At the outset, I will present the problem and the three families of theories of territorial rights, namely the voluntarist, statist, and nationalist. Subsequently, I will attempt to show how the boundary problem poses a challenge for all three theories. Finally, in the last section, I will discuss whether any of them can solve it in a satisfactory manner. There I will also be engaging with scholars who each represent some variant of one of the three theories.

I. The boundary problem and the three families of theories of territorial rights

As an extension of their territorial rights, states possess the right to exercise jurisdiction over territory. The boundary problem challenges theories of territorial rights to justify why states' geographical boundaries encompass more territory than what the respective theories argue that states have a valid claim on. That is, it is prima facie problematic that states claim jurisdiction over territory that they are not justified in claiming according to these theories' respective requirements for valid territorial claims. In other words, cases where states claim jurisdiction over 'unim-

proved' land (that is, land that has not been labored on); over territories where they do not perform their legitimating functions; or over territories that are not integral to their respective peoples' lives. The unjustifiably claimed territory (that is, according to the criteria of the respective theories) can surround and/or be surrounded by territory that states do have a valid claim on. Differently put, this 'surplus' of territory that I will be referring to may be located (roughly speaking) at the center and/or beyond the rim of the territory that states justifiably claim jurisdiction over. In the following, I will assume that states claim jurisdiction over a surplus of territory located both at their center and beyond the rim of the territory that they have a valid claim on. Before a discussion on the boundary problem can commence in full, we should first gain an understanding of the theories of territorial rights in contention.

The first family of theories I will consider—the voluntarist—is inspired by John Locke (1632-1704), who held that the feature which distinguishes private property from common property is that the former has been "mixed" with the labor of individuals. In the case of land, Locke (2011:719-721/§§27, 32, 35-37) claims, labor involves improvement, such as by tilling or cultivating it. According to his *proviso* that there must be land "enough, and as good, left in common for others," agents are limited to only acquire land that they will utilize. Unutilized land, he maintains, belongs to all human beings in common. His view represents the individualist version of volunta-

rism, which holds that states derive territorial rights from agents' property rights over land. On his account, individuals have consented to a state's gaining jurisdiction over their land, thereby granting it rights over territory, namely a contraction of the land in question (Locke 2011:738, 744/§§99, 121-122). According to the collectivist version, by contrast, a group of individuals (composing a state, say) acquires territorial rights in the same way that individuals, on the individualist account, gain property rights (Nine 2008:148, 155). Voluntarist theories are also backwards-looking, meaning they focus on the historical aspect of territorial rights, namely on how they were acquired initially and subsequently transferred over time.

Statist theories of territorial rights come in two forms: the first of which, variably inspired by the works of Thomas Hobbes or Henry Sidgwick (that is, the Hobbesian or Sidgwickian variety), identifies the achievement of peace and order as the state's function. On the second version, the Kantian one (also referred to as the "legitimate state theory"), the function of the state is that of administering justice, the performance of which secures its legitimacy (Moore 2015:89). Both versions are said to be functionalist (or function-based) theories, because they claim that states' territorial rights are necessary for them to perform their legitimating functions (Simmons 2015:148). By "legitimating functions", I mean something along the lines of the "provision of opportunities, security, equal respect," and so on, to people present on their territory (Kolers 2009:127). In regard to functionalism, the boundary problem (as formulated in the introduction) concerns cases in which states claim jurisdiction over more territory than "what they meaningfully require to perform their legitimating functions," by which I understand territory on which states have little to no human conduct to regulate.

Since it is primarily the latter version of functionalism that is defended in the contemporary literature, I will here focus solely on it, which, as I alluded to earlier, is inspired by the political writings of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant (1996:52/Ak. 6:265; see also ibid., 90/Ak. 6:312) opposed Locke's idea that it is necessary to improve land—in Kant's words, to "build on it, cultivate it, drain it, and so on"—in order to acquire it. Contrary to the Lockean theory, Kant held that only states can be territorial rights-holders, and that these rights are primitive, that is, not derived from the rights of other agents (be they individuals or collectives). Functionalist theories are said to be present-looking, meaning they have a "structural"—as opposed to a historical—view on territorial rights (Simmons 2016:59-60). On these theories, then, states acquire territorial rights

based solely on where they presently perform their legitimating functions. Succinctly put, only the "here and now" matters to them.

Finally, nationalist theories hold that nations, groups (national or cultural), or simply peoples, are pre-political holders of territorial rights (that is, prior to the involvement of government), which are acquired based on their attachment to specific territory (Moore 2014:121-122). A particular group's attachment to a particular territory is a bond that has been forged over an extended period of time. For such groups—that consist of members who share certain characteristics, such as a shared history and language—the relevant territory has become integral to their culture and collective identity (Simmons 2015:148). For the sake of brevity, we may call such territory their "homeland" or "heartland". Nationalist theories also regard groups, and not states, as the primary territorial rights-holders (Miller 2012:257-258). Furthermore, on this theory, states serve the role of representing their respective groups, from which their territorial rights are derived. Since groups' identities change over time, nationalist theories can be said to be both backward-looking and present-looking. That is to say, they focus on whether a given territory has historically been, and remains, significant to particular groups.

II. Why the boundary problem is faced by the three theories

How do any of these theories justify states' rights over territory that is located within their boundaries but that do not satisfy their respective criteria for justifying states' territorial rights? I believe I should preface my discussion on this question by pointing out that before any theory can solve the boundary problem, it must first solve the problem of what attaches particular states to particular territory. This problem, which I will refer to as "the particular problem" (not to be confused with the problem bearing the same name mentioned in footnote 2), is paramount to our discussion. For, before we can discuss the question of how states could be justified in claiming territory over and above what they are justified in claiming according to the requirements presented above, we must first understand what attaches any particular state to any particular territory in the first place. The particular problem, I hold, can be easily solved by proponents of voluntarist or nationalist theories, but presumably not as easily by defenders of functionalist theories. According to the individualist version of voluntarism, individuals have labored on a particular area of land which a particular state is granted

jurisdiction over if the property owners consent to state jurisdiction over their land. On the collectivist version of voluntarism, a particular collective (such as a state) labors on a particular area of land and gains jurisdiction over it. Nationalist theories, finally, hold that groups attached to a particular territory are represented by particular states. Since states' territorial rights are on both theories derived from the rights of other agents, the extent of states' right to exercise jurisdiction is limited to territory that those agents are connected to. Thus, both theories hold that states are hindered from gaining jurisdiction over any arbitrarily chosen piece of territory.

However, since voluntarist theories maintain that territorial rights are accorded to states based on which land agents have improved, how can they claim jurisdiction over unimproved land? It does not seem to follow from how this theory justifies territorial claims that states can have a valid claim on unimproved land. After all, on Locke's account, such land has not become any agent's private property, and it must therefore be considered the property of all humans in common up until it has been labored on. Voluntarist theories, then, must be able to explain why state boundaries can encompass continuous stretches of territory that has been only partially improved land by agents. For brevity's sake, we may refer to the area in question as "patchwork" territory. Furthermore, the individualist version of voluntarism faces the distinct problem of so-called "interior dissenters"', to wit, property owners who do not consent to states gaining rights of jurisdiction over their land. Surely, property owners are not guaranteed to consent unanimously to state jurisdiction. This kind of territory is also patterned like patchwork.

Proponents of functionalist theories are not as fortunate as competing theories in regard to the particular problem. For, as these theories accord territorial rights to states based solely on where they administer justice, they can according to them claim any piece of territory, as long as they perform this function over it. Therefore, these theories fail to attach particular states to particular territories. This is a consequence of functionalist theories having a structural view on territorial rights, which is indifferent to other agents' (e.g., peoples') attachment to territory. Since they do not seem to justify states' claim on particular territory, these theories cannot justify states claiming jurisdiction over more territory than they require to perform their legitimating functions. Prior to achieving this, a limit must be put on where states have a right to exercise jurisdiction, so that they cannot claim any territory as long as they perform those functions on them.

Further, it is not clear from this why functionalist theories would not warrant states expanding their current boundaries by annexing the territory of neighboring states, as long as they perform their functions over the relevant territory, thus rendering borders extremely unstable. Lastly, because functionalist theories justify territorial claims in this manner, they might have trouble justifying states' claims on territory where their presence is "weak" or "thin", meaning territory where they fail to perform their function of administering justice. On the types of territory in question, criminal and illegal activities may take place without state interference. For instance, gang violence may render the area unsafe and uninhabitable for other citizens.

Nationalist theories face a problem similar to that of voluntary theories, since both hold that territorial rights are accorded to states based on which territory other agents (e.g., peoples or groups) are attached to. That is, the former family of theories must be able to justify why states can claim territory that is not integral to groups' lives. Since such territories does not qualify as those to which they are attached, it seems that states do not have a valid claim on them. Thus, like voluntarist theories, nationalist theories face the problem of justifying states' jurisdiction over patchwork territories, which in this context the relevant group is only partially attached to. The criterion of groups' attachment does not seem to grant states jurisdiction over land located in-between the territory that they are attached to, or land located beyond the rim of the territory that the groups are attached to, but which are nonetheless enclosed by state borders. So, while nationalist theories may justify states' claim on heartlands, justifying states' claim on "hinterlands"—land that is not integral to groups' lives—is a more difficult matter. Having argued why the boundary problem represents a challenge for all three theories of territorial rights, I will now proceed to assess how their respective proponents address these worries.

III. Replies to the challenge posed by the boundary problem

The aim of this section is not to argue that any of the three theories are superior to their respective competing theories. Rather, my aim is merely to assess whether proponents of any of the three theories of territorial rights can provide a satisfactory answer to the boundary problem. The three scholars that I will be engaging with each defend some variant of one of these theories.

Lockean theories, we saw, must account for the problem of justifying claims on patchwork territories (that is, partially developed land), and the individualist version

must answer to the worry of dissenters. The main (or perhaps sole) proponent of the individualist version of voluntarism, A. John Simmons, illustrates the problem of claiming patchwork land. Simmons (1992:268) remarks that if he were to raise a fence to enclose an area, he would then be claiming the land enclosed by the fence, even if the land in question had been only partially improved. Thus, fixing the boundaries of property apparently becomes arbitrary; for, if he can claim land that has been only partially improved, by enclosing it with a fence, what stops him from claiming land outside the enclosure? Perhaps the best strategy would be to interpret the requirement of improvement less literally, as a literal reading of Locke's view seems to render the criterion for justified territorial rights too demanding. For as Robert Nozick (1974:174) amusingly remarks, building just the fence itself, on this view, would make agents entitled solely to it and the land underneath and not to the area it encloses. His *reductio* illustrates that, as a unit of measure, labor only grants agents rights over very clearly delineable land that has been improved, and not over land that has been enclosed by something they have labored on. Labor, after all, mixes only with concrete objects, and not with land or objects that surround them.

In an attempt to overcome this challenge, Simmons (1992:273) suggests that we ought to reanalyze the concept of labor as "a kind of purposive activity aimed at satisfying needs or supplying the conveniences of life." On this conception, Simmons (1992:276, 279) claims, labor can mix with "external things" (by which, I presume, he means land that is part of our life plans but that are not our private property) very seamlessly, as the boundaries of property will be determined by "the nature of the activity." This strategy seems to alleviate one of the problems that Lockean theories face, as represented by Nozick's *reductio*, because labor may extend, on this non-literal reading, to more than just what we improve. However, by modifying the labor criterion, Simmons faces another problem, namely that the nature of purposive activities does not make delineations very clear. Just how are we to delineate the land that they will encompass? Therefore, I gather, Simmons (2001:319) concedes that "many compelling and perfectly valid Lockean claims to land have only vague or "limiting" contents, rather than precisely delineable contents." Further, due to his commitment to the Lockean position, he is not afforded the option of arguing that states would be justified in claiming vast spaces to facilitate future settlement, as this move would violate Locke's *proviso* (Simmons 2001:314–5). Therefore, it does not seem that Simmons can adequately solve the boundary problem, even if he reanalyzes Locke's labor crite-

rion in a non-literal manner.

Anna Stilz (2011:578–9) attempts to rectify functionalist theories' issues with solving the particular problem, by suggesting that these theories can attach particular states to particular territory via particular peoples, who have a prior right to occupy the territory in question. She suggests according rights to peoples (as on nationalist theories) are represented by states. But in so doing—as has been argued by Margaret Moore (2014:126–7)—her view seems to reject the fundamental statist view that states' territorial rights are primitive or non-derivative. To be fair, Stilz (2011:579) clarifies that this move does not involve granting the rights of territorial jurisdiction to any agents other than states. However, the charge is still valid, as their rights are nonetheless derived from that of peoples, which they gained prior to state involvement. Furthermore, since on her account there is no need to appeal to a people that "preexists the state," the job of defining and delimiting peoples becomes the responsibility of the states. But, how can they decide which individuals belong to which people, unless Stilz presupposes the existence of boundaries? Further, how are *these* boundaries to be defined and delimited? Due to these issues, her attempt to solve the particular problem, and consequently the boundary problem, seems to falter.

That being said, functionalist theories in general may be able to justify why states can claim jurisdiction over more territory than they require for performing their legitimating functions; for, as long as states perform their function of achieving justice over the territory in question, their claim is valid. That is to say, even though states do not require the territory in question to perform their legitimating functions, they would still be performing the same function as elsewhere within their borders. As long as their claims on any given territory are not challenged by claims lodged by other states, we would perhaps be hard-pressed to question states' rights to govern the relevant territory. The success of this reply presupposes, however, that functionalist theories can solve the particular problem. Regardless, they would still have trouble justifying jurisdiction over territory where states fail to perform their legitimating functions. As we have established, their presence over such territory is weak, and therefore they are not justifying in claiming the territory in question, according to the functionalist requirement for valid territorial claims. Proponents cannot appeal to the fact that a state has implemented the laws of the relevant territory, for that is simply not how these theories justify states' jurisdiction over territory. That is, the functionalist requirement that states must administer justice over the relevant territory is more demanding than that.

David Miller, a proponent of nationalist theories of territorial rights, maintains a relatively conventional stance on the placement of boundaries. His view is that a group's "transformation" of land, which involves endowing it either with material value (in his words, the "quasi-Lockean" requirement that the land has been cultivated) or with symbolic value (meaning the relevant land has acquired symbolic significance for the group), establishes its territorial rights (Miller 2012:258–9). As for state boundaries, Miller remarks that, for one, current borders usually encompass more territory than groups are attached to, and, secondly, that the land they are in fact attached to usually do not determine where borders should be set (2012:263). He attributes these facts to historical contingencies, a point that I will not dispute. Miller's view is that, provided a people has transformed most of the land that it currently occupies, and no rival claims are made "to parts that could be recognized by redrawing borders," a state can be justified in asserting territorial rights on behalf of that group. The absence of rival claims, however, does not fully justify states' claiming jurisdiction over more land than their respective groups have transformed. Miller's two requirements of labor and attachment, which he argues justify territorial claims, obviously do not justify states' claim on land that groups have not labored on or they are not attached to. States' claims on such territory may in those cases, I take it, be merely provisionally justified. In the case that rival claims are lodged by another state, that is, the current state's claim on the relevant territory may be trumped by those claims, if the rival claimant is able to provide proof that the group it represents is in fact attached to the contested territory.

We may add that at least one benefit that nationalist theories have over voluntarist theories is that the former kind can account for states' claims on undeveloped land, because a group is not required to cultivate a mountain, say, in order to attach themselves to it. That is not to suggest that on this theory a group may attach itself to mountains or plains that none of its members have set foot on, for they cannot simply "make themselves" attached to land at a whim (Simmons 2015:154). As we established above, attachment in this sense requires that the bond between a particular group and a particular land has been forged over an extended period. Therefore, the main problem faced by nationalist theories is that of justifying state jurisdiction over land that is not groups' heartlands—similar to how voluntarist theories have problems justifying claims on unimproved land. As we saw, nationalist theories cannot fully justify such claims.

The charge that Millers' theory must account for states' claim on territory that groups have not transformed presupposes, however, that transformed territory can plausibly be delineated from untransformed territory. I doubt that the process of doing so would be very seamless in regard to territory transformed with symbolic value—except, perhaps, in cases of natural geographical formations that are easily distinguishable, such as mountains or canyons—but the feat may be easier to achieve in regard to territory transformed with material value. This is so because products of labor, such as bridges, are more concrete than, say, plains. Still, as on Simmons' theory, fixing the boundaries of territory according to Miller's requirements would not be effortless. Perhaps, then, it would be for the best if we allowed for vaguer delineations.

The main take away from our discussion on their theories, I suggest, is that we should admit of a certain degree of indeterminacy in the process of fixing boundaries according the theories' respective requirements. Briefly put, it is not obvious just where states boundaries should be placed, according to those requirements. What this entails for the boundary problem is that we should concede that no states' territorial claims would be fully justified according to those theories. We may simply be demanding too much of these theories by expecting that states must be able to justify their jurisdiction over every square inch encompassed by their borders. Therefore, a less rigid option seems like a more promising alternative for solving the boundary problem. That said it is beyond the scope of this essay for me to suggest such a solution to this difficult issue.

IV. Conclusion

In this essay, I have argued that the three families of theories of territorial rights—the voluntarist, the statist, and the nationalist—seemingly fail to solve the boundary problem. The problem for voluntarist theories in general is that they must account for land that has not been labored on by agents (be they individuals or collectives), while the individualist versions must additionally account for interior dissenters. Functionalist theories primarily face the problem of justifying particular states' claims on particular territories, which renders their claims on territory arbitrary. In addition, these theories face the problem of justifying state jurisdiction over territory where their presence is weak. That said, functionalist theory could potentially justify claims on territory that they do not require to perform their legitimating functions, as they would perform those functions over them regardless. Lastly, nationalist theories must account for territory that is not integral to groups' lives. These theories have at least one benefit over voluntarist theories, namely that of justifying claims on undeveloped land.

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NOTES

[1]Territorial rights are a bundle of rights, which includes a state's right to exercise jurisdiction over territory (a geographical area) by making and enforcing laws within its borders. Other territorial rights include the rights to control borders and natural resources within them. See Stilz, 'Nations, States, and Territory' in *Ethics*, Vol. 121, No. 3 (2011), 573. In defining "states", I follow Simmons, according to whom "[s]tates are defined in international law … as entities with permanent populations and fixed territories under government control." See Simmons, "Territorial Rights" in Sobel et al. (eds.), *Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy*, Volume 1 (2015), 145.

[2]The name 'the boundary problem' has also been employed to refer to the problem of justifying why citizens of one country ought to submit to that country's jurisdiction rather than of another country. This problem is also referred to as 'the demos problem', 'the particular problem', or 'the attachment problem'. I will employ the names 'the boundary problem' and 'the particular problem' to refer only to geographical, and not to democratic, issues.

[3]By located at "the center," I mean invalid claims on territory which is surrounded by territory that states have a valid claim on, according to the theories' respective requirements for valid territorial claims. By located "beyond the rim of the territory," I mean invalid claims on territory surrounding the territory states have a valid claim on.

[4]The *proviso* has also been formulated as: "enough and as good for others."

[5]See also Simmons, "Territorial Rights" in Sobel et al. (eds.), *Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy*, Volume 1 (2015), 159. In the literature, voluntarist theories in general (that is, of no particular variety) are variably referred to as "property-based", "consent" or "acquisition" theories.

[6]For an exegesis of Kant's views on territorial rights, see Stilz, "Why Do States have Territorial Rights" in *International Theory*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2009), esp. 198.

[7]Nationalist theories also go under the name of "attachment-based" or "connection-based" theories. In the following, I will not distinguish between "nations", "groups" and "peoples". Whenever I employ any of the three terms, I have in mind a collective of individuals with shared nationhood.

[8]While I do not borrow this name from any text in particular, the problem is referred to often in the literature.

[9]I borrow the term "patchwork" from Stilz, "Why Do States have Territorial Rights" in *International Theory*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2009), 192.

[10]Dissenters may hold rights over property surrounded on all sides by property owned by consenters, in which they are called "interior dissenters", who may cluster together. Dissenters located by a state's border may not be as problematic for voluntarist theories, as state boundaries could be moved to accommodate their presence.

[11]Although the consequence that functionalist theories seem to license annexation may appear counter-intuitive, since just states should ideally respect the autonomy of other states and their people, the concern here is primarily that they fail to attach particular states to particular territory. In the case of a failed state (a state that has failed to perform its justice-administering function), perhaps a just state's annexation of it would be permissible, as it could potentially rectify the failure of the state that previously claimed jurisdiction over the relevant territory.

[12]Of course, not all claimed land, such as plains or deserts, are enclosed by fences. Simmons' example of areas enclosed by fences is employed merely for illustrative purposes.

[13]As for interior dissenters, Simmons takes their presence to be unlikely, as a state's initial group of consenting property owners would presumably make up a cluster, which would gradually expand as more property owners joined it. Further, he argues, dissenters could be swayed to consent or relocate to an area beyond state boundaries. They would thus not represent a problem for the individualist view. This position may be warranted, but Simmons must still be able to account for interior dissenters who do not choose either option.

Illustrasjon av Rasmus Kjelsrud

AESTHETIC SYMBOLS AND THE ART WORLD

Nelson Goodman's account of aesthetics is a powerful theory. It manages to be both flexible and rigorous at the same time; engendering an impressive amount of systematization in its understanding of the highly variable phenomena we call art and aesthetic experience. In this essay I aim at a better understanding of Goodman's theory of the aesthetic, which I believe is irreducibly pluralistic.

By Hans Robin Solberg

In part I, I give an overview of Goodman's theory of aesthetic symbols, relying primarily on his *Languages of Art*, or *LA* from now on (1976), but also sections and selected papers from *Of Minds and Other Matters* (1984), *Ways of Worldmaking* (1988a), and his *Reconceptions in Philosophy* (1988b), written together with Catherine Elgin. I focus first and foremost on his so-called 'symptoms of the aesthetic' and what sense they make as characteristics of the aesthetic. I conclude by suggesting that Goodman's account is irreducibly pluralistic about what counts as an aesthetic symbol. In part II, I discuss how, and to what extent, Goodman can accommodate and explain the particular role and importance of social context or institutions in facilitating aesthetic experience. By "the social context" of the aesthetic I mean approximately what Danto (1964) meant by the "artworld", the institutions, practices, theories and other social entities involved in producing, commissioning, presenting, criticizing and selling artworks (or, in more "Goodmanian" terms, objects that tend to be interpreted as aesthetic symbols).

I. The symptoms of the aesthetic

According to Goodman (1976), artworks are symbols, belonging to certain symbol systems, just like linguistic symbols. What tends to distinguish aesthetic symbols from non-aesthetic symbols are not some intrinsic features of the entity that mark the symbol in question (for example, the physical stuff that make up some painting), or being situated in a certain context (like a gallery), or a certain kind of non-cognitive attitude the experiencer takes toward the symbol (for example, focusing on the emotional states the symbol gives rise to instead of interpreting it), rather the distinction is a matter of certain syntactic and semantic relationships between, and features of, the symbols in the symbol system of which the object is interpreted as part of.

The symbol systems themselves, though, are constructed by us, so an object is therefore not intrinsically a symbol or not. It is (at least partly) up to the perceiver to see a particular marking or entity as belonging to one symbol system rather than another. As such an object can serve as many different symbols (or none at all), depending on how it is read. Aesthetic experience tends to arise, Goodman thinks, when one interprets objects by interpreting them as symbols belonging to symbol systems which have some of the following four features:

(1) *Syntactic density*: A system of symbolization has a symbol *scheme*, which is a collection of characters and the rules for their combination; the so-called syntax. In a syntactically dense symbol scheme, for any two characters, there are characters in-between them. The consequence is that for any two distinct marks, no matter how similar, they could be tokens of different character types. This is in contrast with an articulate syntax, like the one I'm writing this essay in, where the letter-tokens 'a' and '**A**' clearly instantiate the same character, but 'b' does not.

(2) *Semantic density*: In a symbol system the scheme is related to a field of reference that imbues the characters with meaning; the semantics. In a semantically dense system, for any two referents, there are possible referents in-between. The consequence is that for any two distinct characters, no matter how similar, they could be referring to distinct referents. So English is semantically dense, as many words are ambiguous or vague in meaning, for example the words 'bank'$_1$ and 'bank'$_2$ are qualitatively alike characters but

might have distinct referents (riverbank and financial institution).

(3) *Repleteness*: Repleteness is meant to further distinguish between forms of symbolization that are dense throughout (that is, both syntactically and semantically). Two symbol systems can be dense throughout, but one of them can be much more replete than the other. When a symbol system is highly replete, any feature of a mark might count towards identifying its character (and thus its meaning also). A smudge on the corner of an electrodiagram (a relatively *attenuated* mark) will not affect the reading of the diagram, but a smudge on a qualitatively alike *sketch* might carry some meaning and be relevant to the interpretation of the sketch. So, although both electrodiagrams and sketches are dense throughout, the symbol system of sketches is much more replete.

(4) *Exemplification*: Exemplification is a kind of reference. An item possessing some feature x and referring back to the label 'x', is exemplifying 'x'. So, for example a tailor's swatch is exemplifying certain of its features, like color and texture, but not others, like small or square (Goodman, 1988a:64). Thus, exemplification is a kind of showing forth or exhibiting, pointing to the tailor's swatch we might say 'this is "red"'. In contrast to the *denoting* statement 'this is red' that indicates that the object possesses the given feature. Exactly which of its features a given object exemplifies is dependent on context and use of the object, but it is usually only a proper subset of the set of features the object possesses. This is why we cannot say that exemplification is the converse of denotation, since although "if x exemplifies 'F', then x is denoted by 'F'" is always true, the inverse "if x is denoted by 'F', then x exemplifies 'F'" can be false (as with 'square' in the case of the tailor's swatch).

This view of things can be complicated if we introduce the notion of *metaphorical* denotation, which is the application of a label to an object not standardly in the realm of reference of the given label. This re-mapping of the label to a new realm is metaphorical when it is guided by the prior use or meaning of the label in a non-arbitrary[1] way.

Thus I can call a picture or painting sad, in a metaphorical way, when, under some suitable re-mapping, emotion words, like 'sad', 'happy', 'angry', and so on, are applied to color distributions on 2-dimensional surfaces (as opposed to emotional states of human beings and other animals, the standard realm of reference). Furthermore, once metaphorical denotation is established, an object can metaphorically exemplify its metaphorically possessed feature. Goodman calls this *expression* (1984:61), so when a picture or painting expresses some feature, say sadness, this means that the picture in question possesses the feature metaphorically. Goodman thinks that this is an important kind of reference in music (and of course expressionist painting).

Goodman (1988a) adds to this list of four symptoms a fifth, which is further discussed in the paper "Routes of Reference" found in his *Of Mind and Matters* (1984):

(5) *Multiple and complex reference*: Multiple and complex reference is when a symbol integrates several referential functions and let them interact, either in a direct manner (multiple) or through a chain of different symbols (complex). For example, we could envision a painting that both *denotes* something (say a terminally ill girl on a bed next to her caretaker seated in a chair), *exemplifies* something (certain colors or shapes), and expresses something (the caretaker's grief and maybe the strange serenity of a dying child).[2] As a symbol this painting has multiple referential functions at once. Complex or chained reference can be envisioned as a series of links between different symbols related to a specific symbol. Goodman gives the example of a picture of a bald eagle (1984:62), the bald eagle-picture denotes a bird that exemplifies the label "bold and free" which in turn *denotes* and is exemplified by a country. As such a picture of a bald eagle might not itself directly denote and/or exemplify a country, but can do so via a chain of links to other symbols.

I now turn to the task of trying to understand why these are 'symptoms' of the aesthetic and also what makes *these* the symptoms.

Why 'symptoms'?

Importantly, none of these five features are, on their own, necessary or sufficient for aesthetic experience. Goodman

suggests that they *may* be conjunctively sufficient (if you have all of them, the symbol gives rise to aesthetic experience) and disjunctively necessary (you can only have an aesthetic experience if the symbol has at least one of them) (1976:254).[3] The point is to have a flexible framework that can account for many different art forms and ways of aesthetic symbolization. So, for example literature is written in a syntactically articulate symbol scheme (thus not dense), but may yet lead to aesthetic experience since a literary work has some of the other features such as semantic denseness. Also, having more or less of these symptoms does not make a symbol more or less aesthetic. Thus, the relationship between these features and aesthetic experience behave in much the same way as the relationship between symptoms and disease: diseases are associated with a list of symptoms that tend to correlate with them, but a patient might have the symptoms without the disease or the disease without the symptoms.

Another thing to note is that these are aspects of cognitive experiences we have when interpreting certain objects as parts of different symbol systems. Thus, as was noted earlier, any given object can probably be rightly interpreted as belonging to several different symbol systems (some aesthetic, some not). Goodman encapsulates this by saying that the crucial question is not "what objects are works of art" but "when is an object a work of art?" (1988a:66–67).

The answer, presumably, is that an object is an artwork when it is functioning as an aesthetic symbol part of a symbol system with some of the requisite features. This is why something with the shape of the letter 'A' printed on a large canvas is a potential artwork. If you read this mark as part of the linguistic symbol system of a language with a Latin alphabet, then you would hardly have an aesthetic experience. Read this way the symbol is articulate, attenuated and denotational; earmarks of the non-aesthetic. But approach the canvas in a different way, let the shape in front of you be part of a symbol system whereupon no finite amount of inspection will you be able to fully determine its character or reference, let any detail at all be relevant to the meaning of the symbol, and look for what this new symbol might exemplify. Now you are reading a symbol that is dense, replete and exemplificational; chances are that you might have an aesthetic experience.

Here is a question Goodman avoids tackling: is the relationship between the intrinsic features of the objects we find in the world and reshape for aesthetic purposes, and the symbol systems we construct to interpret them in, truly and completely arbitrary, as far as the objects and our cognitive faculties go? Or are some objects, *in themselves*,

more fit for functioning as aesthetic symbols relative to our cognitive make-up? It seems Goodman would deny almost any contribution from the objects themselves in defining the aesthetic experiences we have of them (beyond minimally having some spatiotemporal properties we can grasp). Almost all work is done by the symbol systems which we construct and impose on what we observe, and we are quite free in constructing them any way we like. Thus, the idea of an un-interpreted object with qualities conducive to aesthetic experience prior to the construction of a symbol system in which it is to be interpreted, makes little sense to Goodman. One potential criticism of Goodman is to say that this radical constructivism might be a bit too radical. Potentially, the construction of symbol systems is more constrained than Goodman thinks, and one determining factor influencing our construction might be intrinsic features of the objects we interact with, together with facts about our cognitive and experiential faculties.

All the same, I think Goodman is right to talk about the symptoms and functions of aesthetic symbols as opposed to necessary and sufficient criteria for membership in a class called 'artworks'. This allows for a non-exclusive and tentative conception of what can count as artistic or aesthetic, and welcomes the denial that there is a particular aesthetic *essence* all artworks instantiate.

Why those symptoms?

Yet, we must ask ourselves: what sense does it make to enlist *these* features as symptoms of the aesthetic? Of course, the lesson from the last section is that we should not expect a highly unifying principle that binds these symptoms together in answer to our question. In a sense, to Goodman, there is no "*the* aesthetic", and consequently there might be diverse reasons for considering these symptoms (and maybe even others) as contributing towards aesthetic experiences. So, we cannot substitute the symptoms for a single underlying reason as definitive of the aesthetic, as that would give us what Goodman tries to avoid, namely the *one* essential functioning of an aesthetic symbol.

Having said that, Goodman makes some remarks on the motivation for choosing these specific symptoms in both *LA* (1976:252–253) and "On Symptoms of the Aesthetic" (1984:135–138). The main reason is that these features contribute to the *non-transparency* of the symbols in question, forcing us to remain attentive to features of the symbol itself (instead of what it is a symbol for). Non-transparency is not meant be to be a value-laden term; it is not bad *per se* for a symbol to be non-transparent. But

what is non-transparency?

Let us start with a contrast case of a relatively *transparent* (and non-aesthetic) symbol system: the set of characters are {'←', '→'}, the set of meanings {*left*, *right*}, and the relation between the characters and meaning {<'←', *left*>, <'→', *right*>}.[4] Let us assume that this system is syntactically simple (any compound of the characters are meaningless), and syntactically articulate (any marking will either pick out one and only one character or no character at all), from the field of reference we can see that it is non-ambiguous and semantically disjoint.[5] Now, in a situation where this symbol system serves as direction-showing system, these symbols are pretty transparent, that is to say, the meaning is easily accessible and one can read the direction any mark symbolizes without much thought (imagine stumbling upon one of them in a corridor with a left-right cross point, you would not be in doubt about where its pointing you). So, in seeing '←' I will almost immediately read this as pointing me *left*, I am led from symbol to the symbolized with little to no effort.

In contrast, a non-transparent symbol makes the interpretative task much more difficult (in certain symbol systems the interpretative task might be essentially open-ended); primarily by drawing attention away from what a symbol is a symbol of, towards features of itself and the task of interpretation. Non-transparency requires greater concentration on the symbol itself. This makes sense as one of the key aspects of aesthetic symbols and experiences because it helps us understand why in the case of the aesthetic (as compared to the non-aesthetic) there is a deeper and less arbitrary connection between what a symbol symbolizes and *how* and in what *form* it carries through its symbolization. Having characterized the symptoms above it is quite easy to see that they will in general add to the non-transparency of a symbol, but let us quickly describe why.

Denseness in general calls for greater care in discerning the character and reference of a given symbol; in some systems the determination of character or reference might even require an endless process. *Repleteness* calls for attention to many or all of the features of the symbol in determining its character and reference (like with the example of a *sketch* as opposed to an electrodiagram given above). *Exemplification* asks us to not go from the symbol to something denoted but from a feature of the symbol to some label; as such we must be attentive to the features possessed and exemplified by the object itself. For example, in literary texts as opposed to non-literary texts it can matter what properties the text itself has and exemplify, such as

rhythm, rhyme, and even shape (as in the case of "concrete poetry" where the arrangement of the printed letters has a specific shape).[6] Lastly, *multiple* and *complex* reference requires a more careful mapping of the different referential functions and chains of association a given symbol has. Compare, as an example, the complexities involved in appreciating a picture of a bald eagle as a symbol for a country, in contrast to the recognition of actual bald eagles using a picture with a strictly denotative function from a book on ornithology.

Here, then, we have some considerations motivating the choice of symptoms above. Specifically, we are asked to reflect on the fact that the process of interpreting aesthetic symbols is usually somewhat open-ended and non-transparent, and these are here seen as key characteristics of such interpretation. Furthermore, it helps us understand why the aesthetic more often than not requires of us to be attentive (both in the creative and interpretive process) to what *form* the symbol takes. But, as warned against earlier, this would not exhaust the aesthetic according to Goodman; it is just more typical of aesthetic symbols for them to be non-transparent. As he writes at one point "I am not denying that expert revelatory description or depiction or exposition can constitute art" (Goodman 1984:136). Furthermore, this non-transparency is not necessarily meant to hinder us from achieving the goal of the interpretative process, namely understanding. But it might facilitate new and interesting, maybe even to some extent more rewarding, ways of understanding.

How satisfying is this account of the symptoms? One could imagine a kind of disappointment with the way I've told the story. We asked why *those* symptoms, and in answer we got some considerations that partly answers the question but essentially remains only a part. We saw that non-transparency is still not the one unique distinguishing feature from which aesthetic experiences arise, although it is very important to many of them. We have yet to hit upon the bedrock of the aesthetic. But should we think that there is such bedrock of the aesthetic to be found? If the answer is "no", I think we should be satisfied with an account that is *irreducibly pluralistic* about the nature of aesthetic experience. That is, there is no single feature common to every aesthetic symbol. I find motivation for such a view in Goodman and Elgin's (1988b) radical pluralism about the world itself. They claim that reality can be conceptualized in many ways, and though some conceptualizations are more legitimate than others (there are, so to speak, some standards in play); within the range of 'legitimate conception of reality' there will always be

found a plurality. In trying to account for aesthetics, then, it should not surprise us that there is no single principle or notion from which our aesthetic experiences flow.

II. The Art World

Let us change gears. So far we have tried to understand Goodman's theory; we now turn towards an attempt at assessing its strength. It is a theoretical virtue of an account that it is able to explain and unify several of the aspects of the phenomena for which it is an account. To test the merits of Goodman's theory in competition with other theories of art, we can investigate whether or not it can explain the same phenomena in an equally good or maybe even better way.

In *LA* (245–252) Goodman tries to do this for the role of emotion in aesthetic experience. Many theories of art take as their starting point the notion that aesthetic judgement is grounded in the sentiments, arising from some emotional or non-cognitive state in the experiencing subject. Goodman denies this, and thinks that aesthetic symbols, being *symbols*, are first and foremost meant to be interpreted and understood, an essentially cognitive task. That does not mean that Goodman's account banishes from view the role emotion *can* play in aesthetic experience. In fact, I think we learn something deeper about the role of emotion in aesthetic experience; they acts as *means* in the cognitive task of interpreting the aesthetic symbols, not the end. That is, the understanding is "endowed" with emotions in its attempt to grasp meaning (*LA* 1976:248).

The point here is to illustrate what I take to be part of the power of Goodman's account: it is able unify and tie together in explanatory satisfying ways many of the considerations that fuel other theories or accounts of art. What some theorists thought was *definitive* of aesthetic experience as such (emotions) is shown to be only one of many tools we have in connection with aesthetic symbolization and the cognitive task of interpreting them. Furthermore, we get an explanation for why that aspect of the aesthetic experience *can* play a role in Goodman's account. Thus the role of emotions have been subsumed and explained within the framework of the symbol theory of art.

I think we can add similar considerations for the notion of the "artworld"[7] and its role in connection with aesthetic symbols. As a social phenomenon the art world is an indubitable entity: what we call artworks are surrounded by people who produce, commission, preserve, promote, chronicle, criticize, sell and even theorize about them – this is the art world. But some philosophers have gone further than just characterizing these social phenomena.

Frustrated by the difficulty of looking for the essence of art or the aesthetic, especially in the light of the proliferation of more modern art forms, like Duchamp's readymade art and Warhol's replicate art, some philosophers have suggested that it is necessary and, more importantly, sufficient for something to count as art as long as it is accepted as such by the social institutions we here call the art world. So, on some versions of so-called *institutional* theories of art it is definitive of something being an artwork, an object for aesthetic experience, that it has this status conferred upon it by the art world.

In light of Goodman's theory, I think this train of thought signifies confusion. It gets the explanatory agenda all wrong. On the picture in the above paragraph we are wondering why some objects are called 'art' and some are not, the institutional theory then wheels in social institutions to *explain* how certain objects become artworks (maybe by some act of *transubstantiation*, a mysterious process where the artists and high priests of the notorious artworld somehow confer the property of art onto certain non-art objects, turning wine into blood and bread into flesh). With Goodman's theory we get the chance to invert the explanatory relationship, it is not the social institutions that explain the existence of aesthetic symbols, it is the aesthetic symbols that explain the existence and use of the social institutions.

How so? The basic answer is similar as in the case with emotions. The social institutions surrounding aesthetic symbols act as *means*, facilitating the creation, interpretation and further development of aesthetic symbols, towards aesthetic experience. If artworks are symbols with a tendency towards non-transparency, it is not so strange that something like galleries, theaters, opera houses, the art market, art journals, and so on, arise: they help facilitate, by creating a more conducive environment, the interpretation and appreciation of aesthetic symbols.

Here it might be helpful with an analogy to science. Plausibly, the point of scientific activity is to achieve some degree of knowledge and understanding of reality. At the same time, to achieve these goals, we have created social institutions, like universities, research facilities, scientific journals, and so on. And although it might be interesting to study the social aspects of scientific activity, it would be, to most, confused to take science to be *nothing more* than those social aspects, to think that science is *defined* solely by its institutions. The same goes, I think for the artworld. Yes, aesthetic symbolization and interpretation tend to happen in certain restricted social contexts. But art (or aesthetics in general) does not reduce to these institutions.

The existence of such institutions are instead explained and motivated by the underlying account of artworks as aesthetic symbols. Thus, similar to the case of emotions, embedding objects that tend to play the role of aesthetic symbols in highly specific social contexts is not *definitive* of the status of the object as an artwork but simply a means to the cognitive end of interpreting and contemplating the aesthetic symbol.

Again, we find that Goodman's theory has a capacity to unify and explain. This time it is the role of the artworld that has been subsumed and explained within the framework of the symbol theory of art. To me, this is a more fulfilling account of the social dimension of aesthetic experience, explaining its function in facilitating the interpretation of aesthetic symbols. Also, this view might make available some further insights about how to evaluate and maybe normatively criticize our social institutions. Since they are only *means* towards other independent goals, we can ask to what extent they are functioning in accord with our goals, much in the same way the independent goals of science can inspire us to criticize and reform the social practices trying to achieve those goals.

Conclusion

In this essay we have looked at Goodman's theory of aesthetic symbols. First, we tried to understand the theory. We saw that the symptoms of the aesthetic allow for an interesting and flexible account of aesthetic experiences. We focused on the underlying notion of non-transparency, but also how the theory might suggest an irreducible pluralism about the nature of aesthetic experience, in the sense that there is no single feature common to every aesthetic symbol. Second, we tried to assess the theory's strength. I argued that the importance of the social institutions of the artworld, so central to institutional theories of art, can be subsumed and explained in a satisfying way by Goodman's theory of artworks as aesthetic symbols, adding to the strength of the theory.

Admittedly, the essay has been a philosophical love letter to Goodman's theory of art. The remark acts as a warning: infatuation brings with it rose-tinted glasses. But even through such a skewed perspective one can still hopefully observe some insights and beauties that will remain when the rose-tint gives way to clear daylight in which cracks and shortcomings might also come into view.

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NOTES

[1] This is in contrast to an arbitrary re-mapping of a label, potentially making the label polysemous.

[2] The scene is taken from Edvard Munch's *Det syke barn* (*The Sick Child*), which is not, in fact, the name of a single painting but rather six slightly different paintings and a number of lithographs, drypoints and etchings.

[3] Confusingly enough, he retracts this suggestion in his *Of Mind and Other Matters* (1984:135). A charitable interpretation of this is that Goodman never claimed that the symptoms are conjunctively sufficient and disjunctively necessary under the everyday concept of the aesthetic, but instead he claimed that maybe they ought to be so under a philosophically stringent concept of the aesthetic. This gains support in light of (Goodman 1988:68–69).

[4] This set is the semantic relationship that maps each symbol in the character-set to a meaning, hence the ordered pairs.

[5] The system will also, in a direction-showing context, be relatively attenuated (the only feature that matters is the position of the head of the arrow relative to its body). Interestingly though, the system is arguably exemplificational as the symbols have as features being oriented (relative to any facing observer) in the direction the symbol denotes, thus showing the direction by referring to its own possession of the given directionality.

[6] A nice example of this is George Herbert's poem "Easter Wings" from 1633, printed sideways in the shape of a pair of wings.

[7] The term is taken from Danto (1964) but I do not attempt here to give a precise account of Danto's views.

EN ANNEN TENKNING ER MULIG

Anmeldelse av
Ingen mennesker er født frie
Dybedahl (mfl.)
(Oslo: Dreyers Forlag, 2017)

Av Håkon Blystad

Ingen mennesker er født frie (Dybedahl mfl. 2017a) er en bok om liberalisme, men strekker seg over flere fagfelt. Boka består av ti artikler som til sammen tar et omfattende oppgjør med liberalismen; alle steiner må snus for å forstå liberalismens gjennomtrengende innflytelse på vårt moderne samfunn.

Dette er bokas hovedtese: Liberalismen har erstattet alle andre politiske projekter.

> Ulike former for liberalisme har i snart fire tiår vært den dominerende tankeretningen i vår del av verden, slik at det politiske spektret er blitt snevret inn til ulike sjatteringer av liberalisme. (Dybedahl mfl. 2017a:10)

Marxismen er for lengst død som en viktig motstrøm, de sosialdemokratiske partiene har tatt en høyrevridning, og som et forsøk på å fremstå «hippere» kaller de konservative seg nå for sosialkonservative. Liberalismen dominerer altså den politiske debatten, der ulike posisjoner og partier ikke lenger representerer vidt forskjellige politiske projekter, men varianter av det samme projektet. *Ingen mennesker er født frie* forsøker å skape en debatt om liberalismen ved å kritisere liberalismen, og ved å vise at en annen politisk tenkning er mulig.

Liberalismen har en lang filosofisk tradisjon, fra historiske tenkere som John Locke og Immanuel Kant til moderne tenkere som Friedrich Hayek og Milton Friedman. Det er klart at liberalismen kommer til uttrykk på ulike måter hos disse tenkerne, og at de vektla ulike aspekter ved liberalismen. Men i løpet av de siste femti årene har en ny liberalisme vokst frem, nemlig *sosialliberalisme*. Dette er en ideologi som i tillegg til å mene at staten skal beskytte individet fra inngripener i dets frihet, også mener at staten til en viss grad skal være med å realisere individets frihet, ved å gjøre det lettere for individet å ta gode og frie valg, som utdanning og sosiale sikkerhetsnett. Denne nye sosialliberalismen gjør en god definisjon av liberalismen – som helhet – vanskelig, fordi den gir samfunnet en mye viktigere rolle i realiseringen av individers frihet, enn hva den klassiske liberalismen gjør. Det kan se ut som sosialliberalismen skiller seg såpass fra den klassiske liberalismen at det er mer fruktbart å snakke om to distinkte retninger, enn to grener av den samme. Et forsøk på en definisjon kan, allikevel, være slik: Liberalisme er den politiske ideologien som hevder at frihet er samfunnets viktigste verdi.

Å knytte liberalisme til frihet er nettopp det bokas første artikkel gjør. Sigurd Hverven (2017:23--26) knytter særlig den *negative* friheten til liberalismen. Negativ frihet forstås som frihet *fra* innskrenkninger. Videre ser Hverven på hvordan filosofene Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich von Schelling og G.W.F. Hegels teorier om frihet. Hverven argumenterer for at disse kan utvikle vår forståelse av frihet, fordi de ser på frihet som noe *relasjonelt*. For dem er frihet noe som et individ bare kan ha i samspill med andre, og særlig viktig er den friheten som oppstår mellom individer basert på gjensidig *anerkjennelse*. Disse filosofene kan sies å representere en *positiv* frihetstenkning. Tanken er, svært kort fortalt, at det «ytre» – samfunnet, staten – er med i en positiv grad på å gi individer frihet, i motsetning til liberalismens tanke om at staten bare er der for å beskytte individets frihet.

Rollen og formålet til artikkelen i konteksten av boka kan sies å være følgende: Ved å kritisere en av kjernetesene i liberalismen, negativ frihet, så svekkes liberalismen, og ved å finne tilbake til en positiv frihet så viser artiklen at en annen politisk tenkning er mulig. Med andre ord er liberalismens monopol på ingen måte en nødvendighet.

Denne måten å tenke på liberalismen tar derimot ikke høyde for mye av den politiske tenkningen som har utviklet seg de siste tiårene: Liberalisme hos blant annet Onora

O'Neill eller Martha Nussbaum baserer seg på en positiv frihetsforståelse. Å si at all liberalisme tenker på frihet i negativ forstand blir feil. Denne innvendingen kommer blant annet Aksel Braanen Sterri (2017) med. Han hevder at Hvervens kritikk ikke rammer liberalismen som sådan, men ny-liberalismen. Enkelte ganger i *Ingen mennesker er født frie* blir altså vidt forskjellige typer liberalisme sammenblandet, og kritikken av den ene, sosialliberalismen, står som kritikk av hele liberalismen. Denne innvendingen kan besvares ganske enkelt: Boka er en kritikk av nyliberalisme. For å vise hvor bredt og dypt liberalismen har påvirket samfunnet vårt så må allikevel den sosiale varianten også dekkes, for den har hatt innflytelse den òg, som i Pål Rækstads kritikk av John Rawls eller Mímir Kristjánssons artikkel om «effektiv altruisme».

Sterris kritikk har en annen side òg: Hvorfor tar ikke boka tak i den filosofiske liberalismen slik den er i dag, med f.eks. ovennevnte O'Neill, Nussbaum eller Ronald Dworkin? Og hva med filosofer som eksplisitt støtter nyliberalismen og kapitalismen, som Jason Brennan og hans moralske forsvar av privatpersoners rett til å eie produksjonsmidler? Hvis boka er en kritikk av (ny-)liberalismens idéer, og ikke liberalismens politiske og økonomiske konsekvenser (som f.eks. Naomi Kleins *Sjokkdoktrinen* [2007]), så burde vel de mest moderne og mest sofistikerte argumentene for nyliberalisme bli gjennomgått og kritisert.

Kontemporære politiske tenkere burde i større grad vært diskutert, men gjør denne mangelen boka irrelevant for den politiske debatten? I et tilsvar til Sterri, i *Morgenbladet*, skriver redaktørene: «For en antologi som vil ta for seg samfunnsendringene de siste tiårene, er det heller Rawls, Dworkin og Roemer som fremstår som marginale» (Dybedahl mfl. 2017b). Tanken her er at disse sosialliberale filosofene kommer med gode argumenter, men den politiske utviklingen viser at det ikke er deres ideer som har blitt anvendt til utforming av ny politikk. Boka handler om den faktiske politikken og de ideene som faktisk har påvirket samfunnet, ikke de (muligens) best mulige liberale ideene. Det er ikke filosofer alene som påvirker samfunnet. Liberalismens fremvekst har foregått simultant på det ideologiske, økonomiske, sosiologiske og politiske plan, og boka dekker dette ved å diskutere disse områdene. Boken passer til vår samtid og som bidrag til en pågående debatt. Ved å begrense seg til de ideene som "synes" i samfunnet gjør boka seg relevant for folk av ulike bakgrunner, ikke bare filosofer.

Antologien inneholder flere svært gode artikler. Artiklene tar godt for seg bredden av liberalismen. Det er et ambisiøst prosjekt å vise liberalismens påvirkning på samfunnet, men fordi artiklene er såpass tematisk spredt lykkes boka i dette. Alle de ti artiklene handler om forskjellige ting, og tar opp problemer på ulike nivåer. Ved å veksle mellom å diskutere liberalismens abstrakte ideer og konkrete konsekvenser viser artiklene til sammen bredden på liberalismen og at det ikke bare er noe filosofer og andre akademikere tenker på, på kontorene sine.

Et tema som jeg gjerne skulle sett en artikkel om, er hvordan liberalismen har påvirket de sosialdemokratiske partiene, og som ville undersøkt om det er hold i påstanden at Arbeiderpartiet dreier mot høyre, eller en tekst om den nye retningen britiske Labour Party tok med Tony Blair, også kjent som New Labour. Det ville fulgt opp påstanden fra forordet: «Sosialdemokratiske regjeringer har vært sterkt delaktige i å føre nyliberalistisk politikk i Europa» (Dybedahl mfl. 2017a:11). Dette kan lett tenkes å være kontroversielt: Våre egne store partier, Arbeiderpartiet og Høyre, snakker stadig i valgkampen om at valget mellom dem er det store valget mellom hvilken retning landet skal gå. Men redaktørene av *Ingen er født frie* hevder at disse to retningene ikke er så forskjellige som det høres ut som. En slik artikkel ville styrket hovedtesen, nemlig at liberalismen har erstattet alle andre politiske prosjekter. Hvis de som selv mener at de representerer et alternativ, her sosialdemokratene, egentlig vises å være ganske likt liberalismen, ville den største innvendingen mot hovedtesen vært tatt hånd om.

Til sist vil jeg trekke frem to tekster jeg mener er ekstra gode og forklare hvordan de forholder seg til bokas prosjekt. Den første er Oscar Dybedahls artikkel «Drømmen om det fullkomne marked». Liberalismen ser på markedet som et naturlignende fenomen (Dybedahl 2017:45). Adam Smiths *Usynlige hånd* som flytter arbeidstagere rundt i samfunnet til passende jobber er velkjent og et godt eksempel her. Liberalistene mener at markedet fungerer best når alle som deltar i det kan handle uten de hindringer enn markedet selv skaper, slik som pris, tilbud og lignende (Dybedahl 2017:48). Men denne naturliggjøringen av markedet kombinert med imperativet å ikke blande seg inn fører til et paradoks. Dybedahl skriver:

> At markedet … er forlengelse av den menneskelige natur og samtidig må beskyttes mot det store
> flertallet av en sterk stat, leder utover 1900-tallet liberalismen inn i autoritære spor. (Dybedahl 2017:51)

Paradokset er at frihetsfilosofien liberalisme har gjentatte ganger valgt å ty til autoritære midler for å holde markedet fritt fra inngripner. Videre følger en god redegjøresle

Illustrasjon av Rasmus Kjelsrud

for hvordan dette autoritære sporet ble fulgt av Ortega y Gasset, Carl Schmitt, og Friedrich Hayek med flere.

Det Dybedahl gjør her er å snu den vanlige oppfatningen om at liberalisme nødvendigvis fører til frihet. Det finnes nok av eksempler på liberalister, som Dybedahl presenterer, som mener at for å sørge for at markedet får gå sin gang må man ha en sterk stat som hindrer uønsket inngripen. Dette kan bringes tilbake til bokas forord. Der diskuteres det hvordan man skal hindre at høyrepopulismen vokser. Ved å vise forbindelsen mellom autoritær høyrepolitikk og liberalisme, illustrerer Dybedahl et poeng fra forordet, (ny-)liberalismens løsning på høyrepopulismen er mer av det samme som høyrepopulismen tilbyr, «mer ulikhet, mindre fellesskap og mindre demokrati vil bare helle bensin på høyrepopulismens bål» (Dybedahl 2017:19). En skikkelig løsning på høyrepopulismen krever et skikkelig oppgjør med de ideene som står bak høyrepopulismen (Dybedahl 2017:20).

Linn Stahlbergs artikkel «Markedets makt over menneskene» handler om hvordan liberalismen ikke bare er en økonomisk teori som politikere har sluttet seg til, men at det er en samfunnsform som tar kontroll på så godt som alle områder av livet. Dette er særlig tydelig, mener Stahlberg, når man ser hvordan nyliberalismen overfører markedet som modell fra å bare gjelde økonomien til å stå som modell for alle andre områder òg, altså snakker vi ikke lenger bare om et jobbmarked, men et utdanningsmarked, et boligmarked, at vi måles på skolen, hvor flink er man til å lese, hvor flink er man til å oppføre seg og «skolen måles på resultatene» den produserer (Stahlberg 2017:113). Men denne markedsmodellen gjør oss syke, skriver Stahlberg når hun siterer Tiril Hjorthol: «Grådighet, konkurranse og materialisme avler utrygghet, angst, stress, og depresjon» (Stahlberg 2017:120). Implisitt her er at markedsmodellen er ikke laget for å analysere slike følelser. På markedet er det bare tilbud og etterspørsel som teller, og på den måten gjør liberalismen seg ute av stand til å virkelig forstå de konsekvensene den skaper. I et samfunn der uenighetene står mellom ulike sjatteringer av liberalisme, ser utsiktene dårlige ut for å løse dette problemet.

Dette er *Ingen mennesker er født frie* på sitt beste, når den for det første viser hvordan liberalismen påvirker samfunnet, og så viser hvordan den ikke strekker til i å løse de problemene som den skaper. Som sagt har boka et ambisøst projekt: å vise liberalismens grep om samfunnet og kritisere det, hvilket er mye å gjøre for drøye 200 sider. Men, når vi skal løse store utfordringer fremover slik som klimakrisen, problemer knyttet til integrering, og automatisering av arbeid, så er det slike bidrag som trengs. Boken bidrar med undersøkelser av hva som har gjort det umulig for oss å løse dem før, og forslag til nye måter å se løsninger på.

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HANNAH ARENDT AND THE NOTION OF PLURALITY

In this article I argue that plurality becomes Arendt's key concept both for the *vita activa* and for the *vita contemplativa*. I first present her understanding of politics that arises *between men* thus creating a space. This space is the common world where human beings can appear and experience their plurality. I then turn to Arendt's critique of Cartesian introspection in order to illustrate the danger of "common-sense in retreat". I continue with Socrates and his fundamental discovery of the implicit plurality existing when one is involved in the activity of thinking. Finally, I move to Arendt's reading of Kant's third critique, the *Critique of Judgment* and argue that our capacity to form opinions in the manner of aesthetic judgments, as taste, illustrate that not only thinking and plurality are related, also judging is rooted in human plurality.

By Helgard Mahrdt

human beings in the true sense of the term can exist only where there is a world, and there can be a world in the true sense of the term only where the plurality of the human race is more than a multiplication of a single species.

– Hannah Arendt*, Introduction into Politics*

I. Vita activa: politics, action, and plurality

After the experience of totalitarianism, "with all its destructive force", Arendt examined "those spheres of the world and human life which we properly call political". She was "concerned with the various modes of human plurality and the institutions which correspond to them", she asked again "the old question of forms of government, their principles, and their modes of action", and "she … discuss[ed] the 'two basic modes' in which plural human beings can be together as 'equals' from which action springs, and 'with one's self to which the activity of thinking corresponds" (Kohn 2005:xviii).

The 'two basic modes' in which plural human beings can be together as 'equals' are speech and action. Action and speech are the two genuine political activities. For Arendt "politics deals with the coexistence and association of *different* men" (Arendt 2005:93). In *The Human Condition*, we read the well-known line, "men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world" (HC:7). This leads

Arendt to state, "plurality is specifically the condition – not only the *condition qua non*, but the *conditio per quam* – of all political life" (HC:7).

The story Arendt tells of what politics is, starts from the fact of "the plurality of men, indicated in the words of the Genesis, which tells us not that God created man, 'but male and female created He *them*'" (Arendt 2005b:61). She begins her journey in ancient Athens, with Socrates and Plato. Socrates experienced "plurality … within himself when he thought, just as he did in others when he stopped thinking with himself to converse with *them*", however, he was "unable to persuade his … judges that thinking is good for them as citizens" (Kohn 2005c:xxvii). Plato attempted to redress the injustice of Socrates' death. He "constructed an 'ideocracy', the *rule* of the idea of the good, in which there was no further need for persuasion …, and introduced the concept of rulership into the political realm" (Kohn 2005c:xxvi). It was Plato, not Socrates, who influenced the tradition of political thought the most, a tradition that "degrades political action into the categories of means and ends" (Kohn 2005c:xxvii).

Arendt, on the other hand, finds the two essential aspects of human plurality in "Montesquieu's revision of the tradition". Montesquieu introduced "the love of equality" as the principle of action in republics and "the love of distinction" (Arendt 2005:63) as the principle of action in

monarchies. Arendt finds here the two essential aspects of human plurality, in her words:

> Just as there exists no human being as such, but only men and women who in their absolute distinctness are the same, that is, *human*, so this shared human sameness is the *equality* that in turn manifests itself only in the absolute distinction of one equal from another… If, therefore, action and speech are the two outstanding political activities, distinctness and equality are the two constituent elements of political bodies. (Arendt 2005b:61)

Plurality becomes a key concept for Arendt. First, plurality is a factum; second, plurality is the "law" *of the world* – "living beings, men and animals, are not just in the world, they are of the world" (LM:20) –, and third, plurality is *the* human condition. Arendt replaces human nature with the human condition. This is important because her analysis of the extermination camps of totalitarianism had shown the attempt to change human nature. Human beings are able to transgress the conditions of natural life by "creating their own, self-made conditions" (HC:9), thus establishing a political realm where the human plurality becomes visible. And this is the political aspect of the concept of the human condition – "that politics has very much to do with the condition of man, namely with the fact that no matter how or what the nature of man may be (if man has a nature at all properly speaking), not one man sinful or evil, but many men live together and inhabit the earth. Without the plurality of men, there would be no politics; and this plurality is not a quality of his 'nature', but is the very quintessence of his earthly condition" (Arendt, "Authority", quoted from Tassin 2011:273). In the posthumously published *The Life of the Mind* we read: "Plurality is the law of the earth" (LM:19). Arendt scholar Margaret Canovan writes: "In the course of her own response to the experiences of her time, Arendt augmented the world by one word: the word plurality" (Canovan 1992:281).

Plurality cannot be reduced to a simple pluralism, because plurality is not only a plurality of perspectives, plurality is *the* condition of action. Among the three fundamental activities labor, work, and action which Arendt develops in *The Human Condition*, action is the only activity that depends directly on a public space and the presence of others. "Action … goes on directly between men" (HC:7). Action can only happen under the condition of plurality. "No one, not even Achilles, can act alone, and a crucial theme in *The Human Condition* is the consequent boundlessness of action, its inherent unpredictability, and

the strict limitation of the actor's knowledge of what he is doing" (Kohn 2000:123). For Arendt, boundlessness and unpredictability, the calamities of action, "all arise from the human condition of plurality" (HC:220).

That human plurality is "specifically *the* condition- not only the *condition sine qua non*, but the *condition per quam* – of all political life" (HC:7), means a) that one can act only together with others; b) that 'acting in concert' (cf. Edmund Burke) is the true mode of political existence; c) that plurality is the condition of human action, not life and neither the being-in-the-world (Tassin 2011:307). True, politics has to take care of the world and those who live in it. However, the prerequisite of politics is human plurality. Arendt underlines this point and argues that "politics arises *between men*, and so quite *outside of man*, [that therefore] there is … no real political substance". She is indeed no essentialist, and the following statement corroborates this point: "Politics arises in what lies *between men* and is established as relationship …" (Arendt 2005:95).

Now, human plurality is inseparable from equality. In Arendt's own words: "Human plurality, the basic condition of both action and speech, has the twofold character of equality and distinction" (HC:175). Only if we are equal, we can differ from each other. This distinction is not a simple, natural difference, in Arendt's own words,

> the human condition of plurality is neither the plurality of objects fabricated in accordance with one model (or *eidos*, as Plato would say), nor the plurality of variations within a species. Just as there exists no human being as such, but only men and women who in their absolute distinctness are the same, that is, *human*, so this shared human sameness is the *equality* that in turn manifests itself only in the absolute distinction of one equal from another. […] If, therefore, action and speech are the two outstanding political activities, distinctness and equality are the two constituent elements of bodies politic. (Arendt 2005b:61f.)

In other words, we are all humans, but everyone is exceptional in her or his uniqueness, a uniqueness that he or she actively reveals whenever he or she is willing to act and speak at all, to insert herself/himself into the world and thus begin a story of her/his own.

We distinguish ourselves and become visible in our singular specific uniqueness. We come into appearance when we speak in public. We then reveal both, ourselves and our distinct views about the commonly shared world. "The key thing", Arendt remarks, "is not that [one] can say whatever [one] pleases, or that each of us has an inherent

right to express himself just as he is, the point is rather, that we know from experience that no one can adequately grasp the objective world in its full reality all on his own, because the world always shows and reveals itself to him from only one perspective, which corresponds to his standpoint in the world and is determined by it" (Arendt 2005:128). Consequently,

> if we want to see and experience the world as it 'really' is, we can do so only by understanding it as something that is shared by many people, showing itself differently to each and comprehensible only to the extent that many people can talk about it and exchange their opinions and perspectives with one another, over against one another. Only in the freedom of our speaking with one another does the world, as that about which we speak, emerge in its objectivity and visibility from all side. (2005:128)

To summarize then, human beings' uniqueness, worldliness and plurality are interwoven.

We all share the world we have in common. In a significant metaphor Arendt imagines the world as a table located between those who sit around it. "The world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time" (HC:52). This space between men is hedged in by laws. The utmost importance "of fences of laws between men" (OT:466) came to light when total terror substituted "for the boundaries and channels of communication between individual men a band of iron which holds them so tightly that it is as though their plurality had disappeared into On Man of gigantic dimensions." Arendt explains, "by pressing men against each other, total terror destroys the space between them […], [thus] it destroys the one essential prerequisite of all freedom which is simply the capacity of motion which cannot exist without space" (OT:466-67).

Hence, for Arendt to re-establish the public realm is essential. In *The Human Condition* she claims: "The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak" (HC:52). The common world provides human beings with a space to appear; it provides the condition for political action and for opinions, since "opinions are formed in a process of open discussion and public debate" (Arendt 1963:268). As Steve Buckler writes, "the separation between persons, that allows them to adopt their own distinctive perspectives and so to establish difference, at one and the same time makes possible coherent interaction between plural beings" (Buckler 2011:93). When the world that human beings have in common disappears or is destroyed, as in totalitarianism, where plurality is destroyed, the unique perspective of human beings and each person's ability to come to good judgments is likewise destroyed.

Arendt insists on the worldliness of living beings and on the "almost infinite diversity of [the world's] appearance, the sheer entertainment value of its views, sounds, and smells" (LM:20). This diversity of the world is matched by the fact that "every appearance, its identity notwithstanding, is perceived by a plurality of spectators" (LM:21). Everything that appears to them is "perceived in the mode of it-seems-to-me" (LM:49). "Though each object appears in a different perspective to each individual … the reality of what I perceive is guaranteed by its worldly context, which includes others who perceive as I do." In other words, it is the "inter-subjectivity of the world" out of which "arises the *sensation* of reality" (LM:50).

Arendt makes the "inter-subjectivity of the world" a strong point and writes in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*: "Even the experience of the materially and sensually given world depends upon my being in contact with other men, upon our *common* sense which regulates and controls all other senses and without which each of us would be enclosed in his own particularity of sense data which in themselves are unreliable and treacherous" (OT:475-76).

Turning to Immanuel Kant, Arendt notes that for him, "common sense … did not mean a sense common to all of us, but strictly that sense which fits us into a community with others, makes us members of it and enables us to communicate things given by our five private senses" (Arendt 2003:139). In other words, "common sense presupposes a common world into which we all fit, where we can live together because we possess one sense which controls and adjusts all strictly particular sense data to those of all others" (Arendt 1994:318). Arendt comes back to our common sense in *The Human Condition* where she detects the outcome of Cartesian introspection, of Cartesian *cogitatio*, as 'common-sense in retreat' (HC:283). In her view, the French poet Paul Valéry "was the first to detect the bankruptcy of common sense in the modern world" (Arendt1994:314). The bankruptcy started with "Cartesian reason … entirely based 'on the implicit assumption that the mind can only know that which it has itself produced and retains in some sense within itself'" (HC:283), and ended with the very event of totalitarianism. "Totalitarianism", she claims, has "deprived us of our traditional tools of understanding" (1994:310). "Totalitarian phenomena", Arendt claims, "can no longer be understood in terms of common sense … (They) defy

all rules of 'normal', that is, chiefly utilitarian, judgment" (1994:314).

Against the "common-sense in retreat", Arendt insists that common sense is not "an inner faculty without any world relationship". It is not "the playing of the mind with itself, which comes to pass when the mind is shut off from all reality and 'senses' only itself", but that sense that fits us into the community with others (HC:283-4).

For Arendt, "the function of the public realm is to throw light on the affairs of men", and this happens when human beings talk about the world, and share how the world appears to them. In fact, "the faculty of speech and the fact of human plurality correspond to each other". Adding to this, Arendt writes that this is so "not only in the sense that I use words for communication with those with whom I am together in the world, but [also] in the even more relevant sense that speaking with myself I live together with myself" (1990:85-86). Turning to Socrates and his teachings, Arendt highlights the method he himself called *maieutic*. Socrates didn't want to persuade the multitude, but instead, he wanted "to make the city more truthful by delivering each of the citizens of their truths. The method of doing this is *dialegestai*, talking something through, … this dialectic brings forth truth *not* by destroying *doxa* or opinion, but on the contrary reveals *doxa* in its own truthfulness" (1990:81). "To Socrates," Arendt explains, "*doxa* was the formulation in speech of what *dokai moi*, that is, of what appears to me. This *doxa* … comprehended the world as it opens itself to me" (1990:80). The important point is the assumption that the world opens up differently to every man, according to his position in it; and that the 'sameness' of the world, its commonness (*koinon*, as the Greeks would say, common to all) or 'objectivity' (as we would say from the subjective viewpoint of modern philosophy) resides in the fact that the same world opens up to everyone and that despite all differences between men and their positions in the world – and consequently their *doxai* (opinions) – 'both you and I are human' (1990:80).

Since "every man has his own opening to the world", one "cannot know beforehand what kind of *dokai moi*, of it-appears-to–me, the other possesses" (1990:81). Therefore we have to ask the other one and thereby learn "his *doxa*, which reveals itself to him in distinction from all others" (1990:85). We need "to understand how and in what specific articulateness the common world appears to the other, who as a person is forever unequal or different" (1990:83f.). This kind of understanding, "seeing the world … from the other fellow's point of view, is the political

kind of insight *par excellence*" (1990:84). Indeed, traditionally this has been "the one outstanding virtue of the statesman…, understanding the greatest possible number and variety of realities – … as those realities open themselves up to the various opinions of the citizens; and at the same time, in being able to communicate between the citizens and their opinions so that the common-ness of the world becomes apparent" (1990:84).

II. Vita contemplativa: The Life of the Mind – thinking and judging

To counteract the nightmare of worldlessness, Arendt re-establishes not only the public realm, and understands action as the activity which "corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world" (HC:7), she also reconnects the life of the human mind to the world. Moreover, she suggests that we exercise not only our practical activities but also our mental activities under the condition of human plurality.

Plurality is not only experienced in the public communication between the citizens and their opinions; "plurality", Arendt claims, is "inherent in every human being". Referring to Socrates' fundamental discovery, "that I do not only appear to others but also to myself", she remarks, "as long as I am alive, [I] live in the condition of plurality. I have to put up with myself, and nowhere does this I-with-myself show more clearly than in pure thought, always a dialogue between the two who I am" (Arendt 1990:86-7). In other words, "I in my identity ('being one') relate to myself. This curious thing that I am needs no plurality in order to establish difference; it carries the difference within itself when it says: 'I am I'" (Arendt 2003a:184). So, I am "in the company of the many the moment I start to act", and I am in company with myself the moment I think.

When I think, I am in an existential state where I keep myself company. So solitude is to be distinguished from loneliness, "where I am also alone but now deserted not only by human company but also by the possible company of myself. It is only in loneliness", Arendt points out, "that I feel *deprived* of human company" (LM:74). And yet mental activities, "themselves all testify by their reflexive nature to a duality inherent in consciousness; the mental agent cannot be active except by acting, implicitly or explicitly, back upon himself" (LM:74). I am not only for others but for myself, and as long as I am in the thinking activity, I am in a silent dialogue or as Socrates calls it I am "two-in-one". First, when the thinker "is called by his name back into the world of appearances", he becomes

One again, "it is as though the two into which the thinking process had split him clapped together again" (LM:185).

Socrates' discovery can easily be linked to Arendt's own time. She writes, "we…who have had our experience with totalitarian mass organizations whose primary concern is to eliminate all possibility of solitude – except in the nonhuman form of solitary confinement – can easily testify that if a minimum amount of being alone with oneself is no longer guaranteed, not only secular but also all religious forms of conscience will be abolished" (Arendt 2005a:24).

Arendt was convinced that totalitarianism envisaged "more than loss of the capacity for political action … and more than growth of meaninglessness and loss of common sense" (Arendt 1994:316). Totalitarian transformation, she argued, envisaged "the loss of the quest for meaning and need for understanding" (1994:316f.). In her view, "the people had been brought very close to this condition of meaninglessness, by means of terror combined with training in ideological thinking" (1994:317). "Ideological thinking", she explains, "orders facts into an absolutely logical procedure which starts from an axiomatically accepted premise, deducing everything else from it, that is, it proceeds with a consistency that exists nowhere in the realm of reality" (OT:471).

In 1951, two years after having finished the manuscript on *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, a note in Arendt's *Denktagebuch* reads as follows: "Logic is the sin of loneliness, thus the tyranny of the compelling provable: the conquest by the lonely ones … 'Always inferring one from the other' means to disregard man and the world, means to elevate an arbitrary opinion to a premise" (Arendt 2002:116).

This leaves her with the question: "*Gibt es ein Denken, das nicht tyrannisch ist?*" (Is there, then, a mode of thinking that is not tyrannical?) (Arendt 2002:45). First, the life of the human mind is not the life of one faculty, but of three basic mental activities, of "thinking, willing, and judging … they cannot be derived from each other and, though they have certain common characteristics, they cannot be reduced to a common denominator" (LM 1:69). "Each faculty manifests the characteristic that all", in Arendt's view, "have in common: they are all autonomous, which means they are all free" (LM 1:187). Arendt was convinced that, "in contrast to the will's absolute spontaneity, the capacity for judgment … was liberated by, and therefore closely related, to thinking" (Finn Bowring 2011:259). However, being closely related to thinking doesn't mean that judging proceeds in the same way as thinking. It must have its "own *modus operandi*, its own way of proceeding" (LM 1:216). What, then, is its own *modus operandi*?

I have to ask more precisely: what is the way of proceeding when the objects of our judgments concern the world we have in common, the public political realm, in which the objects we have to judge are particulars and therefore not to be subsumed under general norms? To come up with an answer to the question how we can judge without holding on to preconceived standards, Arendt again turns to Kant, to his third critique, the *Critique of Judgment*. Since the subject of the third critique is aesthetic judgement, we may have expected that she would have turned to Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* which studied the foundation of moral autonomy. Yet, in her view, the authority of the Categorical Imperative is incompatible with thinking. "Thinking," she insists, "inevitably has a destructive, undermining effect on all established criteria, values, measurements of good and evil, in short, on those customs and rules of conduct we treat in morals and ethics" (LM 1:175).

If "thinking results in conscience as its by-product," then, she argues, "judging, the by-product of the liberating effect of thinking, realizes thinking, makes it manifest in the world of appearances, where I am never alone and always much too busy to be able to think" (LM 1, 175; Passerin d'Entrèves 1994:111). Thinking and judging are interrelated. However, we cannot derive "the faculty to judge *particulars*" from the activity of thinking because "thinking deals with invisibles, with representations of things that are absent; judging always concerns particulars and things close at hand" (Arendt 2003a:189). Arendt claims that it is Kant's third critique, the *Critique of Judgment*, which offers the greatest insight into the process of judgment.

Kant distinguished between determinant and reflective judgments (Bowring 2011:261). The first "evaluate the particular from the standpoint of a general rule, and for Kant this is how moral-practical reason operates, demanding that we act on the basis of maxims that we will to be a universal law. Here we can know and talk about the infinite variety of existing things only insofar as we recognize each uniquely existing thing as a particular instance of an abstract specie or schema" (Bowring 2011:260). The second, i.e., the reflective judgment, deals with particulars, here no fixed rules and standards are applicable, and yet we find the ability to say, "*this* is beautiful, this is ugly, this is right, this is wrong" (LM 2:256).

Is it, then, possible to judge 'in a right way'? "'Right' here means not merely technically correct, but also in a human way, as a human" (Masschelein 1996:97). The answer Arendt suggests is that it is possible once we understand

that exercising our judgment presupposes a community, a sense of commonness. For our question of plurality this is of particularly relevance. So, let us see what Arendt finds in Kant's judgments of taste, which he himself applied exclusively to aesthetic taste, a mode of judging which she then can extend to the moral and the political domain.

In the reflective judgment the thinking process "is not, like the thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself, but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in making up my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement" (Arendt 1986a:220). "In matters of judgment", Arendt goes on, "our thinking is truly discursive, running, as it were, from place to place, from one part of the world to another, through all kinds of conflicting views, until it finally ascends from these particularities to some impartial generality" (Arendt 1968a:242). This process of opinion builds on the capacity of making present to my mind the standpoints of those who were absent before I come to a final conclusion. Kant called this way of thinking "enlarged mentality".

Arendt, on her side, is very attracted to this enlarged way of thinking. According to her this means that "the power of judgment rests on a potential agreement with others, and the thinking process which is active in judging something, is not, like the thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself, but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in making up my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with whom I must finally come to some agreement" (Arendt 1968a:220). It therefore isn't surprising that "this enlarged way of thinking, which as judgment knows how to transcend its own individual limitations... cannot function in strict isolation and solitude; it needs the presence of others 'in whose place' it must think, whose perspectives it must take into consideration, and without whom it never has the opportunity to operate at all" (Arendt 1968a:220f.). This is captured in Arendt's definition of "representative thinking", which she described as the key faculty for political judgment:

> Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them … . The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in

their place the stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. (Arendt 1968:241)

Judging is "a specific political ability in exactly the sense denoted by Kant, namely, the ability to see things not only from one's own point of view but by the perspective of all those who happen to be present" (Arendt 1968a:221). I judge as a member of this community and take others possible judgments into account. "This is necessary because I am human and cannot live outside the company of men" (Arendt 1989:67).

III. Concluding Remarks

When Arendt formulates the faculty of political judgment in terms of the ability to see the same object from multiple perspectives, she recognizes the value of opinion in the public realm. We exercise our human capacity to form opinions, that is, judgments in the manner of aesthetic judgments, as taste. In disputing about judgments of taste, we overcome our privacy, and we do take pleasure in such disputes. To Arendt these disputes do not end in truth. Their open-endedness is rooted in human plurality. Whenever we exercise our faculty of judgment, we confirm both our freedom in *and* our relatedness to the world, a world we share and have in common with our fellow human beings. In Arendt's own words, "judging is one, if not the most, important activity in which [the] sharing-the-world-with-others comes to pass" (Arendt 1968a:221).

Plurality, I may say, becomes Arendt's key concept not only for the *vita activa* but also for the *vita contemplativa*. Plurality is specifically *the* condition of action; it is also the condition for thinking and judging. Moreover the manner in which we practice our mental faculty of judging manifests our plurality. However, also this key concept has its limits and should therefore be used with circumspection. First, because it is not at all easy to understand human plurality. Second, because human plurality is no guarantee against dehumanization. Arendt's response to the ever-present danger, revealed by totalitarianism, is the "idea of humanity as a whole. …Without any sense of the solidarity of mankind", she writes in 1945, "nations have in common only the instinct of self-preservation that man shares with the animal world" and warns, "if the idea of humanity, of which the most expressive symbol is the unity of origin of the human species, is no longer valid, then the nations – which owe their very existence to man's ability to organize his communal life politically – become races, natural, organic units" (Arendt 1945-46:33). A few years later, in 1951, the publishing year of *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, we can

find a similar note in her *Denktagebuch*:

> Everything is tied to the difficulty of understanding the specifically human plurality. In contrast to animals, humans descend from One man ("ex uno homine") and in this origin have 1. the guarantee of resemblance to God because God also is only One and 2. the guarantee that peoples don't degenerate or don't need to degenerate into races. The 'ex uno homine', the fact that plurality is secondary, carries the guarantee of 'humanity'. (Arendt 2002:70)

This is a thought written only a few years after totalitarianism and World War Two; it seems, however, that it has not become any less relevant today.

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NOTES

[1]Abbreviations:

HC = *The Human Condition*

DTB = *Denktagebuch*

LM = *The Life of the Mind*

OT= *The Origins of Totalitarianism*

Illustrasjon av Rasmus Kjelsrud

MULTICULTURALISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF POST-RACIALISM

By Eviane Cheng Leidig

I. Introducing Multiculturalism

In the decades following the Second World War, increased migration from the Global South to Western Europe and Northern America led to a shift in how these 'host societies' would accommodate new migrant communities. Where previously 'assimiliation' was the designated course of action, this became replaced with 'multiculturalism' initiatives during the 1970s to foster cultural diversity and mutual 'tolerance'. Thus, language, dress, education, media representation of migrant groups, as well as cultural activities, were prioritised as areas of intervention. Such initiatives were either state-led interventions (e.g. the Netherlands), or took a more laissez faire approach (e.g. UK).

Unique to multiculturalism as a concept is that it emerged in response to state policy initiatives. Often phrased in the discourse of a politics of recognition for a specific ethnic and/or religious community, it often includes the notion of 'integration' whilst simultaneously recognising the plurality of various 'communities'. Contemporary societies are multicultural in the sense that they contain multiple cultures, which are approved of rather than simply tolerated (or opposed), and that they must be given positive recognition in the public sphere. Here, culture is described as a common set of beliefs and values shared by a group that identify as that group. It is experienced as both an individual and collective identity.

Multiculturalism, as taught in the academy today, stems from a particular school of thought beginning in the 1980s. Largely studied in North America, Australia, and Western Europe, particularly in the UK and Netherlands, multiculturalism developed from the sociological tradition of exploring the intersectionality between 'ethnicity', 'race', 'gender', 'class', etc. (in quotations due to their socially constructed and thus contested nature). In the context of increasing migration from the former colonies, this would include exploring patterns of identity-making across generational divides in relation to 'feeling' part of the imagined nation whilst often occupying liminal diaspora and/or migrant spaces (indigenous populations would subsequently be recognised in policy initiatives). 'Belonging' is thus a key refrain within multiculturalism scholarship.

Multiculturalism is not without its critics, who often describe it as a 'failure'. The underlying argument is that it privileges certain minority groups under the guise of 'political correctness', viewed as inherently unequal in liberal democratic societies. More critical is the foundational theoretical assumptions of multiculturalism, namely the Eurocentric specificity of the term (including individualism vs. groupist categorisations) which has conjured a majority-minority dichotomy. This problematisation is key when considering how multiculturalism is experienced in praxis. There is a risk of essentialising tendencies that come with universal appeal. Besides the critique of universalism, relativism, and role of 'culture', of further concern is the appropriation of multiculturalism discourse from a progressive connotation centred on social justice identity politics, to its exploitation by those seeking to create exclusionary agendas. The recent emergence of the alt-right, for example, challenges the racial(isation) dynamics of multiculturalism by purporting that such categories are to be reframed to include 'native' identity contestations in Western societies.

I next highlight two major debates in multiculturalism scholarship in the UK and US, namely the shift from biological to cultural racism, and the emergence of a 'post-race' dialogue. Focusing on these two areas of intervention allows us to situate how questions of race/racialisation are integral towards developing a comprehensive multiculturalism framework.

II. From biological to cultural racism

Multiculturalism scholarship has recognised a shift in the perpetuation of racist discourse paralleling intense and widespread encounters in the globalised present. Unlike evolutionary rhetoric consummated during the colonial project, 'race' can no longer constitute a 'skin-deep' phenomenon. Rather, cultural racism has transcended the (ir)rationality of colour as difference. This is not to neglect

the apparent use of colour as a distinction, but instead highlight how culture became the focal point of articulation. I introduce how culture rose to prominence in contemporary racisms, first providing a brief overview of theorisations on the subject, including 'new racism'. I then address expressions of cultural racism with specific reference to Islamophobia as a resurgent experience, as well as 'xeno-racism' in modern geographies.

Winant describes a present global "crisis in the meaning and structure of race" (2006:987) in as much as the concept of racism persists, yet in nuanced experiences that reflect a changing sociological condition. The contexts of a post-empire and post-racial order in the UK and US, respectively, have fostered new significations of identity politics. Unprecedented levels of migration accompany revised geopolitical interests, creating new threats to the hegemonic logic of nationhood. Retention of the state as an emblem of the self, then, has come into question as a viable option. The root of this constant negotiation lies within race relations. Colour is no longer the pretext for discrimination, as racist discourse has progressed into the boundaries of culture. That is, a nation's cultural 'values' are vulnerable to definition (despite the blatant nature of cultures in flux). Practices of cultural racism are dependent on stereotyping beliefs and customs (seen to be 'foreign' and 'other', not in an unfamiliar Orientalist tendency). Such attempts to preserve cultural identities was coined by Barker in 1981 as 'new racism'. Culture replaced colour in the rhetoric of superiority, as New Right/ Conservative ideology of the 1980s depicted minority cultures to be inassimilable of (white) British lifestyle, albeit through the lens of 'colourblindness' as justification (Barker 1981; Gilroy 1987). Similarly, neo-conservatism in the US shaped "a disillusioned domestic racial liberalism that deplored segregation and redistribution of resources along racial lines in approximately equal measure" (Winant 2006:993). Colourblindness in the US context stems from sensitivity to a hyper-political correctness that seeks to recognise the existence of no racial classification, and instead subsume us into the banner of one race. The result has been a fruitless attempt to address the enduring systematic inequalities that are indeed configured by underpinnings of racist logic.

Much scholarship has been produced around the concept of cultural racism, including how culture intersects with definitions of 'ethnicity', 'community' and 'authenticity'. In the first instance, Alexander (2002) illustrates how racial to cultural 'difference' has come to be historically appropriated within the British landscape, referring to Afro-Caribbean and Asian communities in their distinct constructions. The ethos of liberal multiculturalism from the 1980s onwards redefined standards of cultural integration, thus generating identity formation around 'ethnicity' and culture 'as axiomatic markers of difference' (2002:556). Unfortunately, this 'difference' continues to envisage an 'Other' as a cultural absolute, negating complex hierarchies within individual experiences of the community. Indeed, cultural community ties could be seen as a problematic signifier of identity. Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) highlight that simultaneous attempts within multicultural and anti-racial approaches consistently overlook the 'community' as an insidious space, whereby the former presents 'community' as an uncontested term, and the latter provokes a politics of representation. In other words, intra-community relations reflect heterogeneous and diverse voices that come to be marginalised in the mainstream due to leadership agendas. Considering this possibility, how then, can we address authenticity in the production of culture? Donald and Rattansi (1992) respond to this framing:

> In terms of cultural authority and individual agency… they require a careful analysis of contemporary political struggles over questions of representation, symbolic boundary formation, and identification. It is in this conflictual dialogue that the meanings of 'race', racism and antiracism are forged, broken and remade. (1992:4)

Through a Gramscian lens of cultural hegemonic production and the individual consumer, it brings forth discussion of the commodification of culture and questions of authenticity. When is cultural expression validated as true and legitimate and when is it inherently representational? What role does racism play in fabricating contemporary definitions of culture? These questions are complex and difficult due to our constant negotiation between the visible and the imaginary. Cultural racism exploits on shallow, physical manifestations that are in turn produced as social stereotypes and reproduced in the social unconscious.

Expressions of cultural racism may be found in English press archives dating to Irish and anti-Semitic racialisations (Hickman 1998; Gilman 2009). Both communities were viewed as inferior and constituted as racially 'other,' an early indication that not only was colour a signifier of difference. Both communities were viewed as inferior and constituted as racially 'other', an early indication that not only colour but culture became a signifier of difference.

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Instead of focusing on these periods of xenophobia, however, I trace modern forms of culturally racist discourse concerning the renewal of Islamophobia and 'xeno-racism'. Together, they represent a volatile global condition.

Islamophobia was defined in 1997 by the Runnymede Trust as "dread or hatred of Islam—and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims…[who] are frequently excluded from the economic, social and public life of the nation" (1997:1). The report, *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*, outlines how Islam is framed in a negative light according to principles that have cumulated into a view hostile towards Islam and thus a justification to discriminate and exclude Muslims from the 'British way of life'. Drawing on the Orientalist tradition (Said 1978), this is not the first incident where Islam or Muslims have been configured as an 'Other' in Western historiography. However, due to 9/11 and 7/7, as well as the subsequent 'War on Terror', Muslims in the West have become targeted for their religious affiliation, further alienating a community into margins of society. This has been well documented in the media (consciously and unconsciously), which deliberately employs terms such as 'Islamist', 'extremist', 'terrorist', 'radical', 'fundamentalist', and so forth, hence instilling into our social imaginary an adverse perception of Islam/ Muslims (Saeed 2007). What has been the most complex topic of discussion, though, is labelling Islamophobia as cultural racism, with both the phenomenon and the language that describes it as a cyclical process of redefinition. This task has been complicated by the diasporic and transnational nature of the global Muslim population. Indeed, it begs the question as to how Muslims self-identify amongst an intersectionality of markers: age, class, 'ethnicity', gender, Islamic denomination, and in some cases, nationality. British Muslims are particularly vulnerable to how their identities become (in)voluntarily shaped as an ethnic, racial or religious minority (Meer 2008). Further, anti-Muslim discourse in the UK views Muslims as a religious minority problematic since religion is viewed as a voluntary decision, and especially troublesome given Islam's association with terrorism in the media (Meer and Modood 2009). In many ways, Islamophobia and cultural racism evolved from the same dialectic. Their present usage has been fiercely articulated, yet constantly challenged into new directions of defining the victim's agency.

On 1 January 2014, EU restrictions on free movement of workers from Bulgaria and Romania were lifted, ushering in a tidal wave of culturally racist rhetoric from the British press and public. Like Islamophobia, these responses of 'xeno-racism' (or racism against the displaced and disposed)

can be considered a form of cultural racism, including anti-asylum seeker racism. Sivanandan terms xeno-racism as:

> A racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the former colonial countries, but at the newer categories of the displaced and the dispossessed whites, who are beating at western Europe's doors, the Europe that displaced them in the first place. It is racism in substance but xeno in form—a racism that is meted out to impoverished strangers even if they are white. It is xeno-racism. (2001:2)

The influx of Eastern European economic migrants to the UK has been met with assumptions of threating British jobs and housing. The deepest concern about migratory labour, however, is Britain's dependency on migration for economic survival (Fekete 2009:6). It is precisely this need, but dislike, of migrant workers that an economy of discrimination unfolds. Similarly, anti-asylum seeker racism describes such individuals as a threat to the British lifestyle, particularly when granted the same rights not seen as earned but given. What is frequently left out of the picture is the strict bureaucratic procedures asylum seekers are required to follow or otherwise face brutal deportation policies (Fekete 2001). Very rarely do stories of asylum seekers expose the structural conditions producing asylum or their limited access to the system. The mediatisation of xeno-racism has only exacerbated the shaping of UK foreign policy through a lens of what is 'culturally acceptable'.

The above expressions of cultural racism—Islamophobia and xeno-racism—portray the daily prevalence of racist discourse, integrated into "systematic, recurrent, and familiar practices" (Essed 2002:3). This plethora of 'everyday racism' is configured within all macro and micro-sociological levels of interaction, from policy formulation to casual conversations. Cultural racism can be difficult to target as it is not expressed in simplistic terms of a colour binary, but instead transfixes one's cultural identity in a constantly evolving definition of culture. Difference can only be articulated where it exists in the imaginary.

III. To a 'post-race' approach

Race as a concept originates from Enlightenment scientific principles as a means to justify biological supremacy. Its modern foundations promote normative judgements surrounding racial classifications within a social hierarchy. The term has historically evolved to accompany responses of widespread geopolitical transformations, including fascist and xenophobic ideologies. However, what remains

disputed is the idea of 'race' as a descriptor and condition (Miles 2009). How can we distinguish trajectories of difference and experience, whilst still acknowledging the consequential domination of racial categorisation? Ratcliffe (2004) argues that in order to erase racism from public consciousness, we must reconstruct how difference is perceived. Yet, this emancipatory goal is complicated by the nature of racism, which constantly changes discourse (as described with cultural racism above).

'Post-race' entails abandoning the term race in order to disrupt the boundaries of racism and deconstruct racial logic. Despite attempts to adopt a 'post-race' approach, however, this position fails to examine its own limitations. Even with this liberating objective, such a move posits key negative consequences, most significantly by renouncing its underlying historical roots and past connotations that continue to survive in present institutional structures. Furthermore, rejecting the idea of race merits consideration as to whether or not the expression of racism will disappear. Enacting a 'post-race' approach also neglects the politicised nature of reclaiming race for social inclusion and demarginalisation. I begin by introducing literature on race as a theoretical category, analysing how a 'post-race' definition has failed due to a fundamental problematic by which race is understood and defined. I then highlight the role of the state in shaping race rhetoric, including the politics of multiculturalism, concluding that the fruitlessness of 'post-race' stems from an inability to articulate difference beyond a liberal discourse.

To provide clarity on conceptualising 'race', I draw on Wacquant's proposed thesis of racial domination, which acknowledges that "*the history of racial domination is inscribed in the scientific unconscious of our disciplines* and acts as a powerful censoring mechanism upon all researchers…" (1997:223) whereby race has been constructed in the specific historical context of 20th century United States. This unilateral objectification of race has sublimated any cultural variation. Instead, we are left with a theoretical racism that fails to deviate from a situated circumstance and has been applied as a universally accepted form of relations. Wacquant describes race as a group-oriented notion instead of a problem-oriented one: "It concentrates on documenting the trajectory, condition and experiences of one or several social groups…and misses the dynamic process whereby they were fabricated at the cost of a complex work of *group-making* that inscribed ethnoracial boundaries…" (225). Although not an innovative point concerning social classification, it is a frequently overlooked one. We have come to understand racism as a practice

of stereotyping and essentialising, yet very rarely do we examine the individual act beyond the boundaries of racial performativity.

Hence, we must appraise that race is not a primary method of inquiry but a secondary mode that is mediated by circumstance. Thus, assessing racism should not focus on ascertaining blame and guilt. Rather, the goal should be to "uncover the social and symbolic mechanisms that produce, reproduce, or transform… to *explain and understand*" how race embodies a medium for expression (Wacquant 1997:226–7). Social actors play a key role in determining the articulation of race and thereby shape its value. Yet, Wacquant points out that such discourse, however much it may sustain the concept of race, suffers from its own limitations of analysis. That "if 'race' is a manner of dividing and ranking human beings by reference to selected embodied properties (real or imputed) so as to subordinate, exclude, and exploit them, then we must study those practices of division and the institutions that both buttress and result from them" (Wacquant 1997:229). In other words, we cannot locate the victim of race/racism as a linguistic attribution. Our focus should instead centre on the dividing practices of categorisation, discrimination, segregation, ghettoisation, and racial violence, as analytics of racial domination. Here, Wacquant argues for the abandonment of race as a term and alternatively emphasises dividing practices as instruments of 'ethnoracial subordination'. Although not an explicit 'post-race' approach, I diverge from Wacquant's proposed method largely due to his Foucauldian structure. In this manner Wacquant neglects individual agency and the power of language to define race as social and symbolic. He undermines the significance of discourse, claiming that it creates convoluted analysis. But it is exactly the complexity of language, however difficult the task, which forms the nexus of race. I next compare Wacquant's approach to others on the debate of 'post-race', bearing in mind how these perspectives can be complementary in understanding race relations.

We often analyse race as a method of understanding the dynamics of human interaction, yet until recently, rarely questioned its meaning beyond social domination. One strategy has been to detach race from racism. This approach recognises an "ideological relation of production: that is to say, the ideology of racism constructed the Other as a specific and inferior category" (Miles 2009:195–6). Much literature exists surrounding the historicity of race, but there is an urgent need of separating race from its conditions. To consider this from Wacquant's perspective would be a two-fold process. First is to acknowledge the

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perpetrating universal definition of race and consider how acts of racism can be cross-culturally situated rather than a monolithic expression. The second aspect is to address how race transcends a group-oriented experience in excess of Orientalist tendencies, and instead focus on the individual event. I would add here the specific appraisal of discourse within the 'ideological relation of production' of race/racism to better comprehend its emergence within linguistic exchange.

Nayak adopts a stance that determines how race intersects in research other than using a social constructivist outlook. That is, rather than merely accepting race to have an attributed meaning, we must examine race beyond these parameters. Here, Nayak writes from a 'post-race' perspective that offers new questions to challenge identity. Rather than balancing the tension between racial categorisation and practices of these categories, 'post-race' recognises how a racialised individual is; race is seen as both essentialist and constructivist. Although 'post-race' lacks coherence amongst scholars, Nayak highlights its potential for new forms of identification along an anti-foundationalist outlook. Re-writing race outside its categories allows one to conduct research with new vocabulary, a crucial step in employing the power of discourse.

Despite a 'bricolage' understanding of race, Nayak leaves us with an inchoate ending. 'Post-race' is seen as an instrumental tool for researchers that begets key questions: *How* do we re-write race? And therefore, how can we engage in 'post-race' dialogue? How are our cultural identities produced in the ethnographic encounter if not preconceived? The 'post-race' narrative, despite its aims of deconstruction and reconstruction, bypasses critical examination. I also stress the impossibility of an anti-foundationalist approach that Nayak claims 'post-race' embodies. Much like the fields of post-colonial, post-structuralist, and post-modernist scholarship, 'post-race' will follow a similar trend of intellectual (and often convoluted) engagement. These philosophical movements have been successful in highlighting the limits of their predecessors, albeit with ambiguous emancipatory aims.

Like Nayak, Gunaratnam (2003) analyses how race should be approached, describing the complexity of working with and against social categories. Understanding this 'treacherous bind' requires researchers to critically engage at the epistemological and methodological levels of analysis. Gunaratnam recognises that race, along with class, gender, and sexuality, exists as a social category and remains far from the exception. However, race becomes manifested as a homogenous term, what Wacquant stresses

as the preoccupation with a group-oriented problem. This intellectual cognition originates from the post-structuralist and post-colonial theorisations, which sought to explain our social relations in the wider realm of power dynamics. As such, Gunaratnam pinpoints the issue of reproducing 'race' as a category, whilst still acknowledging the tension of this praxis (between theory and lived experience of 'race'). Thus, there exists a need for greater reflexivity. This should not take form in the binary of cross-racial examination, but instead it should understand the situated nature of categories as they reflect localised dynamics that may or may not appear with static, transient meanings in the wider global milieu. Again, this compliments Wacquant's argument for a culturally relative understanding of race than a universally accepted definition. My argument adds to Gunaratnam in that it asks us to evaluate how 'difference' can be understood and embodied beyond a racial dichotomy. 'Post-race' offers potential for an imaginative vocabulary that foresees difference as a condition, but not as an inhibitor. Yet, the approach is still in its etymology and seeks an appropriate terminology to articulate the value of difference.

Key to the 'post-race' agenda is the production of identity. In the entanglement of a multifaceted and fluid modality of existence, Hall provides a descriptive framework for our reference:

> I use 'identity' to refer to the meeting point, the point of *suture*, between, on the one hand, the discourses and practices which attempt to 'interpellate', speak to us or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on the other hand, the processes which produce subjectivities, which construct us as subjects which can be 'spoken'. Identities are thus points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us. (1996:19)

This conceptualisation places identity as strategic and positional, not essentialist, and recognises its construction within historical and institutional practices. Hall points to identity as a state of flux determined by and receptive of difference. His understanding of difference, however, is limited to the Eurocentric paradigm of the politics of marginalisation and exclusion. Like my response to Gunaratnam, I challenge this definition of difference from a problematic to a productive one. Both Hall and Gunaratnam comprehend the uneasiness of difference in the liberal paradigm: in short, if an act of difference threatens the security of liberalism, the retaliation is pro-

jected towards an individual's identity. If we are to draw on identity as a process of exchange, at least in the 'post-race' approach, we must deconstruct preconceived notions surrounding relationality… What does a 'post-race' identity signify? Further, how can difference challenge the nexus of race and identification? Hall claims that identity operates 'under erasure' or a 'treacherous bind' as Gunaratam puts it. Despite attempts by 'post-race' scholars to move beyond its epistemological classification and create new ontological meaning, like identity, race occupies a liminal space. Hence, we reinscribe the language of race but only within what Derrida describes as thinking at the limit (1997). By presupposing race contrasts with 'otherness', it draws our attention to the inclusivity of these categories and that transcending them only stretches this dualism.

Given the above, how could 'post-race' be applied in state policy formations? This is a difficult task to undertake considering how race and the nation are a deeply interconnected project. The role of the state in formulating a census exercises powers of categorisation and knowledge production surrounding social stratification. By constructing this reality, the state creates a collective identity fostered on the notion of ethnic, and to some extent, multicultural loyalty (Kertzer and Arel 2001). I examine how the UK has responded to multiracial developments in light of nation-building with a foundation of liberal multiculturalism.

The UK's census includes detailed information concerning national (e.g. English, Scottish), racial (black, white), and ethnic (black Caribbean, South Asian) identity (UK Census 2011). Government policy for a 'multi-cultural Britain' endeavours to accommodate for cultural diversity, and as such, census statistics are vital for this purpose. Although the UK government's aim was towards a politics of recognition and integration, these statistics instead offered a confusing set of results that only reinforces difference. It assumes that ethnicity would be a choice of self-identification when in actuality, categories pre-define one's ethnic options. The census categories further masked embedded class inequalities that exist along traditionally racialised lines. In this sense, adopting a 'post-race' discussion seems a viable choice. Yet, rejecting race generates the unintended consequence of displacing social justice agendas that mobilise on the facets of institutional racism. It is precisely this tension between 'post-race' and the politics of recognition where multiculturalism fails as a framework.

The UK currently suffers from an inability to contend with what Vertovec (2007) characterises as a 'super-diversity' of its population. One approach has been to evaluate this condition as a need to express a politics of

state recognition of group difference, and subsequent accommodation within the public domain. Whilst Parekh (2006) argues that the state must create new measures of opportunity in order to enhance equality for all, Meer and Modood (2008) introduce the idea of 'civic re-balancing,' or an active inclusion of difference based on the liberal tradition of multiculturalism. It is the belief that upholding democratic ideals of equality will pave the way for an authentic multicultural society. On the other hand, there has been a backlash against incorporating this form of multiculturalism:

> Allowing persons but not their qualities to be incorporated reinforces foundational prejudices of core groups. The pollution of these qualities must be challenged and changed. The cultural structures of real civil societies need broadening if outsiders are to become more familiar than strange. (Alexander 2013:547)

The political accommodation of minority groups/racialised subjects neglects key structural elements that only posit cultural diversity as a phenomenon to be tolerated rather than engaged. There have been several futile attempts to situate difference within the British landscape beyond the applicability of citizenship rights. Once again, I argue that this failure to incorporate difference lies beyond the liberal conception. If 'post-race' is to adopt a vocabulary that is truly anti-foundationalist, it must incorporate a new discourse of difference than current essentialising tendencies. Unfortunately, this impact has yet to be felt. Difference is seen as an end instead of a productive process. This leads Kundnani to describe a crisis of multicultural representation, whereby "the ultimate problem is identified as 'cultural barriers', rather than institutional racism or deprivation… 'community cohesion' is about networks, identity and discourse, rather than poverty, inequality and power" (2002). Multicultural politics attempts to mediate race relations as "ethno-religious communitarianism" (Modood 2011), stymied by lack of conceptual approaches otherwise. The response against this policy is the maintenance of cultural barriers that Gilroy (2004) argues has become an increasingly popular recourse: "Why should the assertions of ethnocentricity and untranslatability that are pronounced in the face of difference have become an attractive and respectable alternative to the hard but scarcely mysterious work involved in translation, principled internationalism, and cosmopolitan conviviality?" The role of the state, then, should not be to focus on 'race' per say, but rather to examine the power of racism and discourse. Gilroy em-

barks on the 'post-race' trajectory by asserting the invalidity of race; by first deconstructing the idea of 'race,' the hierarchies that sustain it can then be dismantled. What I propose are the technicalities of that operation. *How* can we delegitimise race as a concept? What are the possible ramifications of annihilating race for political projects?

In conclusion, 'post-race' proposes an intellectually innovative framework to apprehend and describe our social relations. What I challenge is the failure of this approach to conceive a new vocabulary of identification not steeped in the liberal paradigm. Crucial to the 'post-race' project is the necessity of new discourse rather than simply adding a prefix. Doing so only reasserts race as a classification. Instead we should turn to deconstructing and evolving race, e.g. establishing authenticity of a racialised culture. If 'post-race' scholars are to better comprehend the identification process it is necessary to analyse the dynamisms of a discursive, racial performativity. Dissociating the expression of 'race' from the expression of 'difference' is the first step towards achieving any form of 'post'.

IV. Conclusion

This essay highlights the emergence of multiculturalism in praxis, as developed in cultural racism and the 'post-race' approach. Considering these scholarly interventions allows us to formulate how issues such as pluralism translate from policy-oriented frames towards an embodied experience in everyday lives.

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OVERSETTELSE
LA POLITICA COME SCIENZA AUTONOMA

ANTONIO GRAMSCI

Innledning og oversettelse ved Vera Gjermundsen & Sverre Hertzberg

Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) var en italiensk filosof, journalist og politiker, særlig kjent for sine bidrag til nymarxistisk politisk teori. Hans kritikk av den økonomiske determinismen – som vi finner hos Marx og Engels, nemlig ideen om at all sosial forandring kommer fra endringer i økonomiske strukturer – kan sies å ha skapt en mer nyansert form for marxisme, der ideologi og andre intellektuelle faktorer spiller en viktigere rolle. Gramsci hevdet at den dominante klassen i et samfunn ikke bare kontrollerer samfunnet med økonomisk tvang, makt og vold, men også gjennom et ideologisk monopol. Gjennom rådene samfunnsinstitusjoner blir borgerskapets meninger og interesser som gitte for resten av samfunnet og fremstår som «sunn fornuft» (Ransome 1992:26). Dette ideologiske monopolet til overklassen kalles hos Gramsci «Hegemoni» (*egemonia*), og utgjør et av hans viktigste bidrag til marxismen. Han forener ideen om hegemoni med den klassiske samfunnsinndelingen til Marx mellom basis og overbygning. Basen er samfunnets produksjonsforhold og produktivkrefter, mens overbygningen er samfunnets sosiale institusjoner, ideologi, kultur, normer og politisk struktur. Det er altså i overbygningen hegemoniets manifesteres (Ransome 1992:27). For Gramsci betyr dette at en kommunistisk revolusjon ikke kan forekomme uten, og må alltid starte med, et hegemonisk skifte i overbygningen. Kanskje viktigst for denne prosessen er ifølge Gramsci de intellektuelle, som gjennom litteratur, journalistikk og filosofi har muligheten til å bidra til endringer i hegemoniet.

Gramscis liv var preget av både teoretisk og politisk virksomhet. Han begynte å studere ved Universitetet i Torino i 1911, en by som på den tiden i stor grad var i ferd med å industrialiseres, med blant annet bilfabrikken til FIAT som stadig ekspanderte. Der engasjerte han seg i den lokale arbeiderbevegelsen, og kun to år etter at han hadde begynt å studere ble han med i det sosialistiske partiet i Italia. Men han ble etter hvert kritisk til partiets passive holdning til revolusjonen, som etter den marxistiske modellen mente at den ville forekomme gjennom en naturlig og deterministisk samfunnsutvikling (Ransome 1992:26). Derfor var han med å starte det kommunistiske partiet i Italia (*Partito Comunista Italiano*), som ble forfulgt av deres fascistiske motstandere, ledet av Benito Mussolini. Den 9. november 1926 innførte det fascistiske regime en rekke «kriselover», i kjølvann av et attentatforsøk på Mussolini, som førte til at Gramsci ble arrestert for sin politiske aktivitet (Ransome 1992:105). Han ble stilt for retten samme år og dømt til 5 års isolasjon, en dom som senere ble fornyet til 20 år. Han tilbragte de siste årene av livet sitt i fengsel, hvor han skrev sitt kanskje mest innflytelsesrike verk, en samling av over 30 notatbøker som ble smuglet ut av fengselet og publisert etter hans død ved navn «Fengselsdagbøkene» (*Quaderni Del Carcere*). Denne samlingen av tekster, skrevet mellom 1929 og 1935, omhandler alt fra politisk filosofi til religion, historie og populærkultur. Gramsci kunne på ingen måte skrive fritt under disse omstendighetene, og i frykt for sensur var han nødt til å erstatte enkelte begreper, blant annet ble begrepet «marxisme» byttet ut med «praksis-filosofi». Gramsci var også alvorlig syk under store deler av hans soning. Gitt de spesielle omstendighetene kan ikke fengselsdagbøkene leses som en koherent teori av noe slag, men må leses som en rekke forsøk på å formulere tanker og ideer. Det blir derfor en vanskelig oppgave å skulle oppsummere hans filosofiske posisjon i en innledning som dette, og vi blir nødt til å forholde oss mer konkret til teksten vi har oversatt.

Teksten vi har oversatt er fra et utdrag fra et essay i «fengselsdagbøkene» (Vol. 3 Quaderno 13). Her forsøker Gramsci å diskutere grunnlaget for politikk som en autonom vitenskap, med utgangspunkt i en kritikk av Benedetto Croces Hegel-inspirerte filosofi om politiske «lidenskaper» (*passioni*). Benedetto Croce (1866–1952) var, i

likhet med Gramsci, både aktiv politiker og filosof. Croce identifiserte seg med marxisme mot slutten av 1900-tallet, men proklamerte senere at marxismen i Italia var død (Hoare 1971:32). Han støttet Mussolini på 1920-tallet, men tok senere avstand fra hele den fascistiske bevegelsen da han i 1925 signerte et manifest for intellektuelle mot fascisme kalt «*Manifesto degli intellettuali antifascisti*». Han er derfor en kontroversiell figur i Italias historiske venstreside, som Gramsci selv lot seg inspirere av i sine yngre dager, men som senere utgjorde en av hans viktigste målskiver for kritikk. Med inspirasjon fra Hegel, mente Croce at historisk utvikling kunne reduseres til en konseptuell dialektikk mellom motsetninger kalt «distinktenes dialektikk». På denne måten abstraheres historien til et sett med distinkte konsepter, som for Croce førte til at kun fire vitenskaper kunne eksistere: estetikk, økonomi, logikk og etikk (Hoare 1971:31). Han benektet dermed politikkens status som en del av vitenskapen og reduserte politikken til «lidenskaper», forstått som aktiv eller passiv emosjonalitet. Det blir derfor svært viktig for Gramsci, som selv mente at politikk er den mest sentrale menneskelige aktiviteten, å kritisere Croces forståelse av politikk.

Lidenskapsbegrepet til Croce er en sentral del i teksten vi har oversatt, og vi vil derfor forsøke å oppklare hva han mener med dette, og hvordan det knyttes til politikk. Lidenskapene kan ifølge Croce forekomme både på individuelt og kollektivt nivå, og manifesterer seg i form av umiddelbare interesser. En slik umiddelbar lidenskap vil føre til umiddelbare og egoistiske feil, på bakgrunn av mangelen på fornuft og vitenskapelig berettigelse. Lidenskaper med et bredere historisk-sosialt omfang, vil føre til såkalte filosofiske feil. Denne filosofiske feilen skal, for Croce, ikke forstås ut ifra et moralistisk perspektiv, men heller som uttrykk for historiens og ideologiens flyktighet når det kommer til dets fenomener som vil, og fortjener å, forfalle. Med andre ord er politiske fenomener – ettersom de oppstår i menneskers lidenskaper – bundet i historiens flytende utvikling, der nye ideologier stadig oppstår og forfaller. I tekstutdraget vi har oversatt kritiserer Gramsci Croces oppfatning av lidenskapspolitikk. Teorien om at alle politiske aksjoner er drevet fram av umiddelbare, flyktige lidenskaper fører nemlig til en paradoksal konsekvens: Croces teori overser nemlig det store mangfoldet politiske fenomener som på tydelig vis karakteriseres som permanente, pre-mediterte, og organisert på rasjonelt og vedvarende vis. Gramsci gir oss en rekke eksempler på slike stabile fenomener: partier, pre-organiserte politiske handlingsplaner, og ikke minst omfattende militære organisasjoner, akademier og hærer. Opphavet til slike fenomener, nettopp i kraft av deres permanens og rasjonelle grunnlag, kan ikke føres tilbake til en lidenskap, hvis det er slik at lidenskaper utelukkende er umiddelbare og irrasjonelle. Likevel utgjør altså slike permanente fenomener et omfattende aspekt av den lidenskapelige politikken, som Croce ikke ser ut til å kunne forklare. Gramsci løser denne problematikken ved å identifisere politikk med økonomi, samtidig som han påpeker at begge kan omtales på separat vis. Politikkens lidenskaper, i seg selv flyktige, kan nemlig gi opphav til slike permanente fenomener nettopp ved å bygge på det «permanente og organiske» grunnlaget som økonomien bygger opp. Slik ser altså flyktighet og permanens ut til å forenes og bygge på hverandre i en dialektikk, samtidig som de er klart adskilte på autonomt vis. Her ser vi altså hvordan Gramsci argumenter for en mer nyansert form for marxisme, hvor verdier, ideologi og følelser ikke kan avskjæres fra de materielle forutsetningene for revolusjon, men er en viktig drivkraft i historiens gang.

Før vi ser på selve oversettelsen er det verdt å minne leseren på Gramscis skriveforhold, som kan ha ført til at enkelte setninger virker ufullstendige eller grammatisk ukorrekte. Vi har forsøkt å holde oss så tro til originalteksten som mulig, og har derfor valgt å beholde strukturen til våre beste evner.

Politikk som autonom vitenskap

Det første spørsmålet som må presenteres og løses i en avhandling om Machiavelli er spørsmålet om politikken som autonom vitenskap, det vil si spørsmålet om hvilken plass politisk vitenskap opptar eller burde oppta i en oppfatning av verden som er systematisk (koherent og konsekvent) – i en praksis-filosofi [*filosofia della prassi*]. I denne sammenhengen, består Croce sin fremgang angående studiene rundt Machiavelli og politisk vitenskap (slik som i andre felt innenfor Croces kritiske aktivitet) hovedsakelig i oppløsningen av en serie falske, ikke-eksisterende eller dårlig anlagte problemer. Croce baserte seg på sin distinksjon mellom de forskjellige momentene til Ånden og på påstanden om et moment i praksisen, som er autonomt og uavhengig, til tross for dets sirkulære tilknytting til hele virkeligheten gjennom distinktenes dialektikk [*dialettica dei distinti*]. I en slik praksis-filosofi, vil distinksjonen ikke være den mellom momentene til den absolutte Ånden, men heller den mellom nivåene til overbygningen [*soprastruttura*]. Det vil dermed handle om å etablere den dialektiske posisjonen til den politiske aktiviteten (og til den tilsvarende vitenskapen) som et bestemt nivå i overbygningen: man vil kunne si, som en første antydning og approksimasjon, at politisk aktivitet er nettopp det første

momentet eller det første nivået, momentet der overbygningen er fortsatt i sin umiddelbare fase av ren frivillig/spontan bekreftelse, uklar og rudimentær.

På hvilket måte vil man kunne identifisere politikk med historie, og dermed hele livet med politikk? Hvordan vil hele overbygningssystemet altså forstås som distinksjoner innen politikk og hvordan vil man dermed rettferdiggjøre introduksjonen av konseptet distinksjon innenfor en praksis-filosofi? Men kan man snakke om en dialektikk mellom distinktene, og hvordan kan man forstå sirkelkonseptet som binder sammen nivåene til overbygningen? «Historisk blokade»–konseptet, det vil si foreningen mellom natur og ånd (basis og overbygning), enhet mellom motsetningene og distinktene.

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Kan distinksjonskriteriet også introduseres innenfor basisen? Hvordan vil man forstå basisen, innenfor systemet for sosiale forhold, hvordan vil man kunne skille mellom elementene «teknikk», «arbeid», «klasse» og så videre, forstått ut ifra et historisk og ikke «metafysisk» perspektiv? Kritikk av Croces posisjon, for hvilken, for polemiske grunner, basisen blir en «tildekket gud», et «noumenon», i kontrast med overbygningens «fremtredelser» [*apparenze*]. «Fremtredelser» både med metaforisk og konkret betydning. Fordi man har snakket om «fremtredelser» fra både et «historisk» og språklig perspektiv.

Det er interessant å etablere hvordan Croce, ut ifra denne generelle oppfatningen, har utviklet sin særegne teori om feil [*teoria dell'errore*] og teorien om feilenes praktiske opphav. For Croce har feilen sitt opphav i en umiddelbar lidenskap [*passione*], det vil si en lidenskap med individuell eller kollektiv karakter; men hva vil en lidenskap med bredere historisk omfang medføre, en lidenskap som «kategori»? Lidenskap i form av umiddelbar interesse, som er opphavet til «feilen», er momentet som i Teser om Feuerbach blir kalt «schmutzig-jüdisch»: men på samme måte som lidenskap-interessen «schmutzig-jüdisch» fører til en umiddelbar feil, så fører lidenskapen som tilhører en bredere sosial gruppe til en filosofisk «feil» (mellom disse befinner feil-ideologien seg, som Croce omhandler separat). Et viktig aspekt i serien «egoisme (umiddelbar feil) – ideologi – filosofi» er fellesbegrepet «feil», forbundet med de forskjellige gradene av lidenskaper, og som ikke skal forstås ut ifra et moralistisk eller dogmatisk perspektiv, men heller ut ifra sin rent «historiske» og dialektiske betydning av «det som er historisk forgjengelig og fortjener å forfalle», altså ut ifra sin betydning av «ikke/bestemtheten» som tilhører all filosofi, opposisjonen «død/liv», «å være/ikke være», det vil si det elementet i dialektikken som må overvinnes gjennom dets utvikling.

Begrepet «fremtredende» og «fremtredelse» betyr nettopp dette og ikke noe annet enn dette, og må berettiges ovenfor dogmatisme: det er påstanden om forgjengeligheten til et hvert ideologisk system, side om side med påstanden om et hvert systems historiske validitet og nødvendighet («Mennesket oppnår bevissthet rundt de sosiale forholdene i et ideologisk terreng»: å si noe slikt, er det ikke å påstå nødvendigheten og validiteten til «fremtredelser»).

Croces oppfatning av lidenskap/politikk utelukker partiene, fordi man ikke kan tenke seg en «lidenskap» i en organisert og vedvarende form: en vedvarende lidenskap er en orgastisk og spastisk tilstand, som fører til en manglende evne til å operere. Den utelukker partiene, og den utelukker enhver handlings «plan» som har vært organisert på forhånd. Likevel eksisterer partiene, og handlingsplaner blir utarbeidet, anvendt, og gjennomført ofte i ekstrem stor grad; det finnes dermed et «mistak» i Croces oppfatning. Det vil heller ikke si at hvis partier eksisterer, at det ikke har en sterk «teoretisk» verdi, fordi i handlingsøyeblikket er ikke «partiet» som handler det samme partiet som eksisterte før; dette kan delvis sies å være sant, men det finnes så mange overenstemmelser mellom de to «partiene» at man egentlig kan si at det handler om den samme organismen. Men oppfatningen, for å være gyldig, burde også kunne anvendes når det kommer til «krig», og dermed forklare realiteten til stående hærer, til militærakademier, og offisielle organismer. En pågående krig er også «lidenskap», den mest intense og febrilske, det er et moment i det politiske livet, det er videreføringen, gjennom andre former, av en bestemt politikk; man må derfor forklare hvordan «lidenskap» kan bli til moralsk «plikt», og ikke en plikt tilknyttet politisk moral, men heller etikk.

Angående de «politiske handlingsplanene» som er tilknyttet partiene som vedvarende ordninger, så burde man minnes det som Moltke sa angående militære handlingsplaner; at disse kan ikke utarbeides og fastslås på forhold i alle deres detaljer, men bare i deres kjerne og essensielle uttegning, fordi handlingens spesifisitet er til en viss grad avhengige av motstanderens trekk. Lidenskapen manifesterer seg nettopp gjennom detaljene, men det ser ikke ut til at Moltkes prinsipp er slik at den kan rettferdiggjøre Croces idé: det ville uansett henge igjen et behov for å forklare den type «lidenskap» til Generalstaben som har utviklet handlingsplanen ut ifra kald rasjonalitet og på «ulidenskapelig» vis.

Hvis Croces forståelse av lidenskap som et politisk moment setter seg fast i vanskeligheten med å forklare og rettferdiggjøre permanente politiske formasjoner slik som partier og i enda større grad nasjonale hærer og generalsta-

ber, for man kan ikke erkjenne en vedvarende organisert lidenskap uten at selve lidenskapen blir til rasjonalitet og gjennomtenkt refleksjon, det vil si ikke lenger lidenskap, vil løsningen ikke befinne seg i noe annet enn i identifikasjonen av politikken med økonomien; politikk er permanent handling og gir opphav til permanente organisasjoner nettopp i kraft av at den kan identifisere seg med økonomien. Men den skiller seg samtidig fra den, og man kan dermed omhandle økonomi og politikk på separat vis og man kan snakke om «politisk lidenskap» som en umiddelbar impuls til handling som oppstår på det «permanente og organiske» terrenget til det økonomiske livet, men som overgår den, ved å inkludere følelser og ambisjoner. Der, i følelsene og ambisjonenes glødende atmosfære, til og med det individuelle menneskelivets kalkyle adlyder andre lover enn de til sin egen fortjeneste og så videre.

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NOTER

[1]En samling teser om Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872), skrevet av Marx i 1845 (o.a).

[2]«Ingen operasjonsplan holder, med sikkerhet, etter første sammenstøt med fienden» – Helmuth Moltke, den eldre (1800–1891) (o.a).

UTDRAG FRA DEN LEKSIKRYPTISKE ENCYKLOPEDI

Sannhet er et omstridt begrep innen flere av filosofiens områder, som språkfilosofi, metafysikk og epistemologi. Filosofer er uenige om sannhet er én egenskap, hvordan denne kan oppdages eller hva som kan "bære" sannhet. Blant teorier om sannhet finner vi for eksempel korrespondanseteorien, som hevder at et utsagn er sant hvis det samsvarer med faktiske forhold, eller koherensteorien, hevder at et utsagn er sant hvis det er forenlig med et sett sanne utsagn.

Sannhetspluralisme er synet at utsagn kan være sanne på flere måter. Det vil si, det finnes flere kriterier for hva som kan gjøre et utsagn sant. Pluralisme hevder altså i motsetning til monistiske syn på sannhet at et utsagn ikke kun kan være sant på en måte, eller i kraft av en enkelt egenskap. Monistiske syn på sannhet hevder at sannhetsegenskapen ikke forandres på tvers av diskursdomener, som matematikk, fysikk, estetikk, eller etikk.

Sannhetspluralisme kommer i grader: *Svak* sannhetspluralisme hevder at det finnes en universell egenskap som er delt av alle sanne utsagn, i tillegg til flere sannhetsegenskaper, som ikke gjør alle sanne utsagn sanne. *Sterk* sannhetspluralisme, derimot, hevder at det finnes flere sannhetsegenskaper, som ikke deles av alle sanne utsagn, og at disse egenskapene kan anta mange former innen forskjellige diskursdomener. Dette betyr at det finnes én sannhetsegenskap som gjør utsagnet «2 + 2 = 4» sant innen aritmetikken, men at det er en annen sannhetsegenskap som gjør Pytagoras' teorem sant innen geometrien. *Moderat* sannhetspluralisme, til slutt, hevder at forskjellige egenskaper kan gjøre utsagn sanne innen forskjellige domener, men til forskjell fra sterk sannhetspluralisme hevder dette synet at alle sanne utsagn deler én egenskap, nemlig sannhet som sådan. P.J.W.-L.

Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905-1980). Fransk filosof ofte regnet som eksistensialismens grunnlegger. Hans hovedverk er *Væren og intet* (*L'être et le néant*) fra 1943, hvor Sartre skrev om en rekke filosofiske temaer som identitet, frihet, og den menneskelige tilværelsen generelt. Hans metode var fenomenologisk, og denne sammenlignes gjerne med Edmund Husserls. Sartre er også kjent for begrepet «ond tro» (*mauvaise foi*), som henviser til at individer handler inautentisk hvis de antar holdninger som de ikke har valgt frivillig.

Illustrasjon av Oda Aurora Norlund

MORAL MOTIVATION FROM FETISHISM?
A METAETHICAL DISCUSSION OF MICHAEL SMITH'S FETISHIST ARGUMENT

MESTERBREV VED
REBEKKA BJORNES

Illustrasjoner av Oda Aurora Norlund

Hva handler masteroppgaven din om?
Oppgaven min handler om sammenhengen mellom moralske dommer og moralsk motivasjon. Jeg drøfter et sentralt argument fra Michael Smiths bok *The Moral Problem*: Smith argumenterer for at en endring i moralsk motivasjon nødvendigvis følger etter en endring i moralske dommer, i hvert fall i det han kaller «the good and strong-willed person». Relasjonen mellom endringen i moralske dommer og motivasjon kan enten forklares internt eller eksternt, og er en sentral debatt i metaetikken. Eksternalistene argumenterer for at det i tillegg til den moralske dommen, er nødvendig med en «desire *de dicto*» – et grunnleggende ønske å gjøre det rette – for å bli moralsk motivert.

Ifølge Smith gir denne posisjonen en feilaktig fremstilling av innholdet i den moralske motivasjonen; han mener at den ytre påvirkningen fører til en form for «moralsk fetisjisme», og at eksternalisme derfor gir rom for en moralsk motivasjon som ikke har sitt utspring i de rette moralske dommene. Smith mener at dette kan føre til at en person blir mer fokusert på å gjøre det som anses som moralsk rett, heller enn å gjøre disse refleksjonene selv. Smiths argumentasjon mot eksternalisme tar for seg tre temaer: (i) «desire de dicto»/«desire *de re*», (ii) relasjonen mellom moralske dommer og moralsk motivasjon, og (iii) hva den dydige personen er/ikke er. I tillegg til de overnevnte temaene har Smith også kriterier for hva en rasjonell person er. Smiths argument er diskutert av en rekke filosofer, og i oppgaven presenterer jeg deres analyser gjennom en tematisk diskusjon: først av kritikken imot Smiths argument, deretter av forsvaret og Smiths egne motsvar til enkelte av kritikerne, før jeg gjør en drøfting av diskusjonen som følger samme struktur.

Hva argumenterer du for/mot i oppgaven?
Jeg argumenterer imot Smiths internalistiske posisjon og for den eksternalistiske posisjonen; hvis Smiths argument skal lykkes må argumentasjonen i alle de tre temaene han inkluderer i sin kritikk mot eksternalisme være sann. Jeg argumenterer for at Smiths egen kritikk kan vendes mot ham, og at han ikke lykkes i å bevise at eksternalisme fører til det han kaller «moralsk fetisjisme».

Hvorfor bør andre lese oppgaven din?
Hva ligger til grunn for våre moralske dommer? Relasjonen mellom moralsk motivasjon og moralske dommer er et komplekst tema, og oppgaven gir et innblikk i studiet av moralske begreper og en sentral metaetisk debatt.

Hva er dine planer for fremtiden?
Fortsette å lese filosofi og å betale ned på studielånet.

WHAT MAKES US WHO WE ARE

ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN EXISTENCE AND TECHNICS, THINKING AND TECHNOLOGY, AND THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE TECHNICIAN

MESTERBREV VED MATS ANDREAS NIELSEN

Hva handler masteroppgaven din om?
Oppgaven min tar for seg forholdet mellom menneskelig eksistens og det tekniske objekt, og relaterer på denne måten spørsmål innen teknologifilosofi til problemstillinger fra den filosofiske antropologien. Dette tematiske feltet omkring teknikk og eksistens blir tatt opp på en todelt måte i oppgaven. For det første skisserer jeg hvorledes den vestlige filosofiske tradisjonen har hierarkisk underordnet det tekniske fra det som definerer oss som mennesker, og hvorledes tradisjonen, på denne måten, har distansert sin egen tenkning og praksis fra det tekniske. Denne filosofihistoriske skissen involverer en genealogisk undersøkelse av forholdet mellom to idealtyper, filosofen og teknikeren, og hvordan forholdet mellom disse to påvirker filosofiens mulighet til å gripe det tekniske og dets relevans for tenkning og menneskets grunnleggende beskaffenhet. For det andre gjennomfører jeg en konseptuell analyse og fenomenologisk beskrivelse av forholdet mellom menneskelig eksistens og teknikk i form av en kritisk gjennomgang av Martin Heideggers filosofi, paleoantropologien til franskmannen André Leroi-Gourhan og teknologifilosofien til den franske samtidsfilosofen Bernard Stiegler. I kritisk dialog med disse tenkerne undersøker oppgaven om mennesket og det tekniske objektet er protetisk sammenkoblet, og dermed om den menneskelige oppfinner er oppfunnet av hva det finner opp.

Hva argumenterer du for/mot i oppgaven?
I oppgaven argumenter jeg for at det antagonistiske forholdet mellom filosofien og teknikken har konstituert en genuin hindring for å tenke forholdet mellom eksistens og teknikk som opprinnelig og konstitutivt. Teknikk er således det utenkte i den vestlige filosofihistorie, det som truer den filosofiske tenkningens idealitet. En reevaluering av den filosofiske antropologien opp mot teknikken innebæ-

rer en kritikk av tradisjonelle tematiske avgrensinger innen humanistisk forskning og oppfordrer til et møte mellom studiet av teknikk og informatikk, på den ene siden, og av kultur og politikk, på den andre. Denne oppfordringen er fundert på et argument om at menneskets eksistensielle egenart er grunnleggende teknisk og tekno-logisk strukturert.

Hvorfor bør andre lese oppgaven din?
Med omfattende automatisering av arbeid og en ny antropocen tidsalder, med kunstig intelligens og maskinlæring i horisonten, fremstår spørsmålet vedrørende teknikk som høyst aktuelt i møte med radikale teknologiers inntog i våre hverdagsliv. Å stadfeste den intime forbindelsen som eksisterer mellom teknikk og menneskelighet i en slik historisk og teknologisk situasjon fremstår for meg som en akutt oppgave for kritisk tenkning i vår tid. Oppgaven min er et første steg i å bidra til dette arbeidet.

Hva er dine planer for fremtiden?
Jeg jobber for tiden som foreleser på Kulturakademiet i Berlin og Barcelona, og kommer til å fortsette i den stillingen fremover, i tillegg til å forfatte fagartikler og starte på et bokprosjekt. På noe lengre sikt er planen å ta en doktorgrad innen teknologi- og mediefilosofi.

PÅ WITTGENSTEINS SLAGMARK

Av Erlend Finke Owesen

En krystallklar høstdag 2016 forlot jeg Oslo for å dra til Cambridge, der jeg skulle ta en ettårig master og oppnå graden MPhil in Philosophy. Lite visste jeg om året som ventet, da jeg ankom colleget mitt, Robinson, sent den kvelden.

Noen dager senere var det cocktail-party i Trinity College for ansatte og studenter ved filosofifakultetet. Etter en oppmuntrende tale fra daværende Knighbridge Professor og Chair of Faculty, Tim Crane, var det tid for mingling. Etter de vanlige utvekslingene om college og herkomst, spurte jeg noen medstudenter om hvilke kurs de hadde tenkt til å ta dette året i MPhil-en. Samtlige hevet øyenbrynene. «Hva mener du med kurs?» spurte den ene. Full av selvtillit sa jeg at jeg hadde funnet kurslisten på nettet og at jeg hadde pekt meg ut det-og-det kurset. «Jeg tror du har misforstått» sa han. «Dette er en research master. Ingen kurs. Kun din egen forskning. Innlevering av essay ved slutten av hvert trimester. Det er alt.» Like etter kom Professor Richard Holton bort og presenterte seg som min «Advisor». Han sa jeg kunne komme til kontoret hans klokken ni morgenen etter og fortelle ham hva jeg ville skrive det første essayet om. Det var jo tross alt innleveringsfrist om åtte uker, så vi måtte finne ut hvem som egnet seg best som veileder. Det ble en travel natt.

MPhil-en gikk ikke på skinner. Det forventes at man produserer original og bunnsolid forskning på åtte uker, og det tre ganger. Eksaminatorer er høyt ansette filosofer som gjør det de kan for å finne innvendinger og kritisere de påstandene man har våget å forsvare. Og selvfølgelig får man bank av typer som Arif Ahmed, Huw Price og Rae Langton. Men med knallhardt arbeid berget jeg meg så vidt. Stressfaktoren var av det ubehagelige slaget, så jeg vil egentlig ikke anbefale dette dersom man ikke føler seg overordentlig godt rustet (noe jeg ikke var).

Uansett, det gikk tilstrekkelig godt til at jeg nå har begynt på PhD-programmet, dog ikke lenger på Faculty of Philosophy, men på Department of History and Philosophy of Science (HPS). På PhD-programmet er stemningen betydelig mer avslappet og min egen trivsel mye større. Hverdagen består stort sett av det samme som tidligere: jobbing med utkast til veiledning som finner sted annenhver uke. Så oppfølgingen er det ingenting å si på, og jeg lærer mye. Forhåpentligvis gir det resultater. Vi får se hva de neste tre årene bringer.

Litt om livet ellers i Cambridge. Selv om jeg ikke er spesielt tiltrukket av britisk kultur som sådan, er collegelivet i Cambridge en opplevelse jeg ikke ville vært foruten. Her fins det mange gamle tradisjoner som fremdeles ivaretas og verdsettes. Én av dem er såkalte «formal halls» – formelle middager som arrangeres jevnlig i alle colleger. Formelle antrekk, «gowns» – akademiske kapper –, latinske bordbønner og «fellows» – de vitenskapelige ansatte tilhørende colleget – ved «high table» hører med. Disse middagene er også den beste måten å besøke andre colleger på, og eventuelt sammenligne portvinen deres med sitt colleges foretrukne. For ja, de skal ha portvin. Både etter og før (!) maten. Av andre festligheter er «May Week» i slutten av juni det som er mest verdt å nevne. Denne uken arrangerer collegene «May Balls». Her får du damer i lange kjoler og med «evening gloves», menn i kjole og hvitt, helstekte lam, casinos, fyrverkeri og mye mer. Holder du ut hele festen blir du med på «survivor's picture» som tas 6.30 om morgenen.

På grunn av størrelsen på fakultetet, så finner det ikke sted like mange filosofiske begivenheter her som i Oxford. Men det fins noe for alle og enhver. For eksempel er det ukentlige møter i Moral Sciences Club, grunnlagt i 1874. Dette er klubben der Wittgenstein, Russell, Moore, Keynes og Ramsey hadde utallige diskusjoner for rundt hundre år siden, og klassikere som Moore's «Nature of Judgement» og Russell's «Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description» så dagens lys for første gang. Man har heller ikke glemt 26. oktober 1946, da Wittgenstein var farlig nære å gå løs på Karl Popper med en ildrake etter at Popper hadde presentert artikkelen «Are There Philosophical Problems?». Konfrontasjonen er foreviget i klubbens rapport, da møtet ble beskrevet av klubbens daværende sekretær, W. Hijab (Trinity), på diskré engelsk vis, som «charged to an unusual degree with the spirit of controversy». Denne beskrivelsen er også konsistent med dagens møter. I dag gjestes klubben av inviterte filosofer fra hele verden som skal bryne seg på Cambridge-fakultetet som alle sitter skuddklare på første rad. Det ender ikke sjeldent med at gjesten blir «hughmellorated» av den skarpeste skytteren av dem alle, Emeritus Professor Hugh Mellor. Er man i Cambridge er det verdt å stikke innom, det er åpent for alle!

Illustrasjon av Erlend Finke Owesen

FILOSOFIQUIZ

Det åpnes for at gode argumenter kan gjøre flere svar riktige.
Interessante løsningsforslag sendes til **redaksjon@filosofisksupplement.no** *og* kan *belønnes!*

SPØRSMÅL

1. Hva er det motsatte av pluralisme?
2. Kan det ifølge Kant finnes andre kategorier enn de tolv han foreslår?
3. Hvilket syn er filosofen John Hick kjent for å forsvare?
4. Hvilken tysk sosiolog kritiserte Marx for å ha et monistisk historiesyn?
5. Hvilke fire former for premisser tillater Aristoteles' logikk?
6. Hvor mange land i verden i dag, har fler enn én hovedstad?
7. Hvilken filosof skrev verket *On the Plurality of Worlds* fra 1983?
8. Hva slags pluralisme er den britisk politiske filosofen Isaiah Berlin kjent for?
9. Hva heter verket av John Rawls som gjerne regnes som en revisjon av *A Theory of Justice*?
10. I følge Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, hva består verden av?

SVAR

1. Monisme.
2. Ja, men ikke for mennesker.
3. Religiøs pluralisme.
4. Max Weber.
5. Universell bekreftende, universell negativ, partikulær bekreftende og partikulær negativ.
6. 14: Benin, Bolivia, Chile, Côte d'Ivore, Georgia, Honduras, Malaysia, Nederland, Sør-Afrika, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tanzania, Vest Sahara, og Jemen.
7. David Lewis.
8. Verdipluralisme.
9. *Political Liberalism.*
10. Summen av fakta, ikke ting.

NESTE NUMMER
FENOMENOLOGI

«Fenomenologi» (fra gammelgresk, phainomenon, altså «det som fremtrer», eller «utseende») er ofte regnet som læren om fenomenene slik de fremtrer, før enhver tolkning av deres natur eller ontologiske status blir diskutert. Består verden først og fremst av ting, eller hendelser? Det er et spørsmål for ontologien, læren om væren. Hvis verden består av enten ting eller hendelser, hvordan kan vi i så fall vite det? Det er et spørsmål for epistemologien, læren om kunnskapens natur. Fenomenologien derimot, skiller seg fra de andre store disiplinene i filosofien ved å ta sikte på å gi en korrekt beskrivelse av hvordan ting oppleves.

Fenomenologien forsøker å ikke ta for gitt teorier eller ideer om hva verden består av eller hvordan dens mange prosesser fungerer, før en grundig beskrivelse av våre opplevelser av den er gjort. Vi må være ærlige med våre opplevelser av verden, før vi sier noe om hva som er opphavet eller årsaken til opplevelsene. Spørsmålet er hvordan våre opplevelser er strukturert, før vi sier noe om verdens struktur. På denne måten er fenomenologien ofte sterkt kritisk til visse metafysiske ideer i filosofihistorien, som dualisme, materialisme, empirisme og rasjonalisme. Fenomenologi kan bli sett på som en metode eller disiplin i bevissthetsfilosofien, eller som en filosofihistorisk retning som ble påbegynt av den tyske filosofen Edmund Husserl på begynnelsen av 1900-tallet. Husserl var opptatt av et viktig begrep som kjent som intensjonalitet, ideen om at sinnet alltid er rettet mot noe utover seg selv: en opplevelse er alltid en opplevelse om eller av noe.

Sinnstilstander som sinne, kjærlighet, glede og sorg er alltid rettet mot objekter, hendelser og mennesker der ute i verden, og ved å undersøke grundigere hva disse opplevelsene består i kan man finne ut mulighetsbetingelsene for de mange former for opplevelse vi har. Noen fenomenologer, som den franske filosofen og psykologen Maurice Merleau-Ponty—tydelig påvirket av Husserl—fant mulighetsbetingelsene for opplevelser i den levende kroppen. Andre, som Husserls egen elev Martin Heidegger, en av de mest innflytelsesrike og kontroversielle filosofer i det tyvende århundre, fant mulighetsbetingelsene for opplevelser ikke i sinnet eller i bevisstheten, men i det faktum at alle mennesker er historisk situert, vi er først og fremst der-væren, Dasein. I dag har fenomenologien hatt en form for renessanse, da den er blitt inkorporert i de kognitive vitenskaper, og den fortsetter å yte sin innflytelse i litteratur og samfunnskritikk, idéhistorie, språkstudier og til og med biologi.

Til neste nummer av Filosofisk supplement søker vi tekster som omhandler noen av disse spørsmålene eller andre filosofiske problemstillinger knyttet til fenomenologi.

Fristen for innsending av tekster er **fredag, 20. juli 2018**.

Vil du bidra med en tekst til neste utgivelse av **Filosofisk supplement?**
Send oss en e-post på bidrag@filosofisksupplement.no.

Til neste nummer av Filosofisk supplement vil alle innsendte artikkelbidrag leses anonymt i tråd med redaksjonens utprøvelse av «blind review». Det vil si at inntil teksten eventuelt blir godkjent av redaksjonen vil forfatters identitet holdes skjult for leserne og omvendt. Dersom teksten blir refusert, vil forfatterens identitet forbli hemmelig. Dette er for å kvalitetssikre lesingen og senke terskel for innsending av bidrag.

BIDRAGSYTERE

Tekst

Håkon Blystad (f. 1997) er bachelorstudent i filosofi ved UiO.

Vera Gjermundsen (f. 1995) er bachelorstudent i kunsthistorie ved UiO.

Sverre Hertzberg (f. 1992) er masterstudent I filosofi ved UiO.

Eviane Cheng Leidig (f. 1991) er doktorgradsstipendiat ved Senter for ekstremisme
forskning ved UiO.

Helgard Mahrdt (f. 1953), er dr. art i tysk litteraturvitenskap.
cand.philol. i filosofi og er statsstipendiat ved institutt for pedagogikk ved
UiO.

Hans Robin Solberg (f. 1990) er masterstudent i filosofi ved UiO.

Patrick Jørgen Winther-Larsen (f. 1995) er masterstudent i filosofi ved UiO.

Bilder

Rasmus Kjelsrud (f. 1992) er tidligere filosofistudent ved UiO, måker for tiden snø
og freelancer som oversetter i Berlin.

Oda Aurora Norlund (f. 1998) har studert kunst, design og arkitektur ved
Elvebakken VGS.